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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents three procedures to detect Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks. DDoS
attacks are known as one of the most expensive and destructive Internet threats. Assuming network
traffic is a marked Poisson process, two parametric detection models are developed. The arrival
of packet flows is modeled as Poisson process with cluster sizes that follows a mixture of discrete
and heavy tailed distributions. Both detection systems monitor the percentage of unknown source
IP addresses. The first detection model is formulated as a fixed sample size binary hypothesis
testing. The decision making is based on the Neyman-Pearson criteria. The second parametric
model is a sequential probability ratio test where the sample size is a random variable. Acceptance
and rejection boundaries are deduced based on Wald’s Fundamental Identity. Given that para-
metric distributions may fail to capture the complex and dynamic nature of the Internet, a third
non-parametric detection model is proposed. In addition to the percentage of unknown source IP
addresses, a second test statistic is introduced. The latter represents the mean to standard devi-
ation ratio of data packet sizes. The Neyman-Pearson threshold is estimated from the empirical
distribution functions of both random variables.
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In the past decade, several renowned e-commerce websites including Yahoo, eBay, E*Trade, and
Microsoft have been the subjects of Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. DoS attacks are designed to
prevent legitimate users from accessing the targeted network. They can be classified into two main
categories. Logic attacks significantly impair target servers by exploiting software weaknesses, e.g.,
sending malformed data packets while flooding attacks seize all the target network resources by
sending a significant amount of fake requests to occupy the network [28, 86]. While it is possible
to design more sophisticated softwares to counter logic attacks, the second type of attacks is much
harder to detect as attack data packets do not have specific characteristics that distinguish them
form legitimate data packets. When the attack is led by a so called “master” and coordinated
across many hijacked systems (zombies), it is called a Distributed DoS (DDoS). A DDoS attack
can involve dozens, hundreds or as many as 60,000 zombies [112, 124], which significantly amplifies
the attack. DDoS attacks are thus among the most destructive and expensive Internet security
incidents. DoS attacks are also becoming more and more elaborate and prevalent; in 2001 alone,
12000 DDoSs attacks were reported over a 3-weeks period [18, 86].
Existing DDoS detection mechanisms can be classified as anomaly or signature based. The latter
compares network traffic features to known attack patterns (signatures), which are pre-recorded in
a database. Anomaly-based systems, which are the most widely used [20], raise an alarm when the
observed traffic features deviate from what is labeled as legitimate activities. While signature-based
systems cannot detect unknown attacks and consequently result in a high False Clear (FC) rate,
an anomaly-based detection system may provide detection results with a high False Alarm (FA)
rate [58]. A FA occurs when a detection system raises an alarm when a legitimate data packet is
sent to the network. A FC indicates that a detection system has allowed an attack data packet
to proceed without raising an alarm. In network security, both FA and FC are undesirable; FAs
result in financial losses while FCs can be fatal to the network and result in even greater financial
losses [7]. The ideal detection mechanism minimizes both the FA and FC rates. However, these are
contradictory objectives. Designing an efficient DDoS detection system thus requires a trade-off.
Using an anomaly-based approach, this thesis presents several novel techniques to detect flooding
DDoS attacks. The next section introduce basic concepts that are used throughout the thesis.
1
1.1 Basic Definitions
A data packet is a formatted unit of data that is transported through a network. Beside the
actual information that is to be sent, supplemental information such as the source and destination
addresses must be encoded with the data before it is transmitted over the Internet. Figure 1.1
illustrates such a packet header. A protocol defines a set of rules for transmitting data between two
Figure 1.1: Packet Header
end-points (within or between computers). It specifies, among other parameters, the data format,
address format, and routing rules. Communications through the Internet uses the Internet Protocol
Suite (IP), which is a set of communication protocols. Several layers of protocol are necessary for
transmitting data over the Internet. Figure 1.2 shows examples of protocols by layer type. The
application layer is a set of methods defined for process-to-process communications across the
Internet. A well known example is the Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP). The Internet layer,
e.g., the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP), constitutes the link between independent
networks. The transport layer provides communication services between hosts and delivers data to
the appropriate application process. A major transportation protocol is the Transmission Control
Protocol (TCP). Together with the IP protocol, the pair is referred to as TCP/IP. Another well
known transportation protocol is the User Datagram Protocol (UDP). The network interface layer,
also known as the data link layer, constitutes the physical interface between the host system and the
network hardware. It describes how data packets should be formatted in order to be appropriately
routed. A router is an intermediary system that forwards data on behalf of the sender. On the
Internet, networks are linked through routers, which are indispensable if the sender and receiver
are not directly connected. Any device connected to the Internet is assigned a numerical label
2
Figure 1.2: Protocol Layer
called the Internet Protocol (IP) address. The source IP address designates the address of the
device where the data has originated. Similarly, the destination IP address represents the digital
address of the receiver. IP spoofing is a technique used by attackers to conceal their true identity.
It consists of altering data packet headers so that the sender appears to be a legitimate host. The
next section describes DDoS attacks more in detail and presents an overview of various defense
mechanisms.
1.2 Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS)
The objective of a DDoS attack is to prevent legitimate users from accessing an online service.
During the attack, key resources such as network bandwidth, memory, and Central Processing
Unit (CPU) are overloaded in a manner that degrades or entirely interrupts the intended service
[86]. Throughout the thesis, target network or victim refers to the network under DDoS attack.
1.2.1 DDoS Attack Structure
As illustrated in Figure 1.3, a DDoS attack comprises three main elements: the master attacker,
the zombie hosts and the victim.
Prior to launching the attack, the master attacker explores the Internet, searching for computers
with low security levels. The technique is known as scanning. After gaining access to a machine,
the latter is subdued thanks to a computer program called bot. The botnet, i.e., the set of zombies,
may contain tens of thousands of computers [104, 112]. At the time of the attack, zombies are
3
Figure 1.3: A Simple DDoS Attack Model
”ordered” to send data packets to the victim, all at once, flooding key resources and causing the
target system to crash. A DDoS attack not only causes damages to the target network but also to
the intermediary computers that have been compromised.
Multiple factors facilitate DDoS attacks. The first is the limitedness of Internet resources; each
host can only handle so many requests. Furthermore, attackers take advantage of the structure of
the Internet. That is, the Internet is designed to efficiently move data packets from one source to a
destination. Neither users nor data packets are authenticated and ordinary routers are programmed
to process any incoming data packet. The lack of authentication allows network intruders to use
fake source IP addresses. Attackers also rely on zombies to hide their true identity. A third key
factor is the global connectivity of the Internet. Indeed, large quantities of zombies can be recruited
and DDoS attacks can be launched from anywhere in the world. Such a broad infrastructure would
require an equally broad global security system. However, each local network usually has its own
set of policies, which may be an obstacle to building such a system. Additionally, there may be
privacy issues that prevent information sharing [82].
1.2.2 Attack Classification
DDoS attacks can be classified into four main categories. These include flood attacks, e.g., UDP
and ICMP floods, amplification attacks, e.g., smurf and fragile attacks, protocol exploit attacks,
and malformed packet attacks. A detailed overview can be found in [28]. The thesis focuses on
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the first type, which is the most commonly observed DDoS attack type [102]. Contrary to logic
attacks, flooding attacks usually need not exploit vulnerabilities at the victim; lauching the attack
with a large quantity of zombies is enough to guarantee its success. The next section presents an
overview of DDoS defense systems.
1.3 DDoS Defense Systems
Preventing and detecting DDoS flooding attacks are very arduous tasks. The greatest challenge is
finding the most descriptive set of Internet traffic features to effectively distinguish legitimate from
malicious activities. In general, flooding attack packets do not present any characteristic that could
be directly used for their detection and filtering. Furthermore, the dynamic and complex nature of
the Internet makes it difficult to model and study network traffic. Additional obstacles include the
lack of a centralized control system for Internet and the insufficiency of detailed attack information
[28, 91, 133].
DDoS defense systems can be classified as preventive or reactive. Detailed reviews of defense
models appear in [28, 82, 102]. The defense layer can be achieved by increasing security, e.g.,
installing secure protocols and strong authentication systems. Attack detection consists of designing
efficient models that can assert whether an attack is taking place or not, by observing traffic
statistics. In this case, detection delay is key.
Moreover, a DDos defense mechanism can be autonomous or deployed as part of a distributed
system [21, 81]. The latter type can be difficult to implement since independent networks have
different control and security policies. Autonomous systems can be set up at three main points in
a given network: the victim-end, the source-end or at an intermediate point in the network. The
main advantage of victim-end defense mechanisms is that network traffic can be observed locally
and modeled so that anomalies can be detected. However, once at the victim-end, the attack traffic
has reached its full potential and defense systems can also be overwhelmed and fail to perform their
designated task. This outcome can be prevented by choosing an intermediate network point away
from the target, the main disadvantage being that incoming attack traffic cannot be fully observed.
Since flooding attacks are more likely to be detected near the target, the present thesis focuses on
developing victim-end detection models.
Furthermore, DDoS defense systems are signature or anomaly based [18]. The second type
consists of monitoring Internet traffic statistics and measuring deviations from what is defined as
”normal” behavior. The choice of the statistic has a significant impact on the detection performance.
Examples of traffic metrics include packet loss (i.e., number of data packets or bytes lost due to
the attack), traffic throughput (i.e., number of bytes transferred per unit time from the source to
the destination), response delay (i.e., time interval between when a request is made and the time
a complete response is received from the destination), transaction duration (i.e., time required for
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the exchange of meaningful set of messages between a source and a destination), and resources
allocation (i.e., proportion of a critical resource (e.g. bandwidth) allocated to legitimate and attack
traffic) [83]. Additional statistical methods applied to DDoS detection are presented in [35]. Chen
and Hwang [21] propose an DDoS detection model that monitors traffic volume at various routers
in the network. The main drawback with this technique is that at earlier stages of an attack, traffic
volume changes are hard to detect since traffic fluctuations are very subtle and similar to normal
traffic. While normal traffic presents a large range of packet sizes, attack data are usually of the
same size. Therefore, Du and Abe [29] propose to analyze the entropy of packet size distribution,
which is more effective than observing traffic volume since short-term attacks do not necessarily
alter traffic volume. This technique performs well when all attack packets have the same size.
However, attackers may generate data similar to the victim’s legitimate traffic [35, 91], i.e., with
variable packet sizes, in which case the entropy method is no longer effective. Peng et al. [101] apply
a sequential change point detection method where they evaluate the increase in the percentage of
unique new source IP addresses compared to a threshold. Additional sequential change-point
detection models include [116, 123]. An extensive review is presented in [18].
Our detection models evaluates the percentage of new source IP addresses in a given observation
window, but unlike [101], each individual source IP address is accounted for, regardless of duplicates.
The next section gives an overview of the research and presents the detection problem.
1.4 Research Overview
This section states the research problem and objectives. It also emphasizes the main contributions
of the thesis and finally gives an outline of the report.
1.4.1 Problem Statement
Consider a network of computers, which is subjected to a flooding DDoS attack. Define the control
router as the router through which incoming Internet traffic gain access to the target network.
Assume attack and legitimate packet flows arrive independently at the control router. As Figure
1.4 illustrates, only one flow of data packets comprising both type of traffic is observed at the
victim-end. Using an anomaly-based approach, the objective of the research is to develop efficient
and easy-to-implement techniques to determine when a DDoS attack is underway. Efficiency is
measured in terms of detection delay, False Alarm (FA), and False Clear (FC) rates.
Definition 1. A false alarm occurs when the detection system signals an attack when in fact only
legitimate traffic is observed.
Definition 2. A false clear occurs when an attack is taking or has taken place without raising an
alarm from the detection system.
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Figure 1.4: Observed Attack and Legitimate Flow
As both FA and FC are detrimental to the victim, the detection mechanisms must be as accurate
as possible so that the FA and FC rates are minimized. Moreover, detection must occur as soon as
possible. The earlier an attack is detected, the more effective the response can be.
The most common detection models are non-parametric. Traffic statistics are directly collected
from simulated or real network traces; thresholds and other model parameters are computed nu-
merically. Given that Internet traffic is very dynamic and complex, non parametric models can
be very efficient. On the other hand, fitting an adequate theoretical model to network traffic al-
low applying detection theory results that are proven to be very efficient. In this case, thresholds
can be determined analytically. Parametric models tend to be more elaborate as they require a
combination of estimation and detection theories. We present both parametric and non-parametric
detection models.
The main statistic of interest in this thesis is the percentage of new source IP addresses. The
method proposed by Peng et al. [101] can be circumvented if the attacker use a small number of
spoofed source IP addresses. In other words, the percentage of distinct IP addresses will not increase
enough to warrant an alarm if attack data packets appear to come from only few unknown sources,
since legitimate data packets can also come from unknown sources. We propose a slightly different
approach and account for every unknown IP individually, regardless of duplicates. Therefore our
statistic is independent of the number of spoofed IP addresses.
As mentioned earlier, designing a DDoS detection system that minimizes both the FA and FC
rates is very challenging since these are contradictory objectives. First, DDoS attack data packets,
especially in the flooding attack case, do not present specific characteristics that clearly distinguish
them from legitimate traffic data. Second, legitimate traffic continues to arrive at the control router
even as the attack occurs, which renders the detection problem even more difficult. For instance,
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even though attack data packets are more likely to originate from an unknown source, legitimate
traffic also generate data packets with unknown source IP addresses. Although the rate of legitimate
data packet with unknown IP is usually smaller compared to what attack traffic produces, the DDoS
detection problem does not become any simpler. Another issue is that attackers constantly modify
their tools [82]. In addition to simulated data, real network traces are collected to evaluate our
detection models. The next section present the two types of traces we used.
1.4.2 Network Traces
To evaluate our detection models, we use real Internet traffic as our legitimate background traffic.
Attack data is simulated and combined with legitimate packets to represent a network under DDoS
attack. The first dataset is the 1999 DARPA dataset obtained from MIT Lincoln Laboratory [72].
The dataset was filtered to keep inbound traffic only. We use the first week (W1) of data for
training and week three (W3) data for testing; week two was ignored because it contains attack
packets other than DDoS packets. The second set of traces originates from the University of
Waikato, which is a much larger network than the Lincoln laboratory network. Multiple traces
are available, we selected Auckland IV, which was the training dataset used in [55]. We focus on
inbound traffic as well. For both the MIT and Waikato networks, data packets sent through the
TCP protocol represent the largest percentage of data packets. For instance MIT’s W1-M contains
623857 incoming TCP data packets out of a total of 651218 data packets, which makes 95.8% of
the traffic. In general TCP traffic represents more than 80% of traffic [55]. Therefore, we filter and
focus on TCP data packets. The relevant input parameters to our detection models include packet
arrival time, source/destination IP addresses, packet size, protocol and ports addresses.
DDoS attack data are simulated and combined with legitimate data packets according to packet
arrival time. Monte Carlo simulations (rather than using real DDoS traces) allow us to control
attack parameters including the rate, duration and packet size. Table 1.1 shows different DDoS
parameters that were used in the simulation. Base on the literature [15, 18, 29, 83, 84, 86], three
levels were defined for each parameter.
Table 1.1: Simulation Parameters
Parameters Low Medium High
Rate λ (pps) 10 160 500
Duration d (s) 600 1800 3600
Packet Size (bytes) 40 576 1500
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1.4.3 Main Contributions
The main contributions of the thesis can be summarized as follows. While the vast majority
of DDoS detection models are non-parametric, we introduce two efficient parametric detection
systems. We apply results from detection theory to prove the effectiveness of the proposed methods.
Furthermore, the parametric models are not only applicable to network traffic but other areas such
as modeling stock returns in finance and total claim in insurance.
The second major contributions is that our detection models have been developed to handle
stealthy and realistic attacks. For instance, we suppose that attackers can apply the source IP
address spoofing technique such that attack data packets appear to originate from what the target
network considers as trustworthy sources. Our models also integrate the possibility that attack
data packets arrive at a dynamic rate.
Another contribution is that we develop traffic statistics that are more effective. For example,
we monitor the percentage of unknown source IP addresses, regardless of duplicates. Unlike Peng
et al. [101], our test statistic does not depend on the number of spoofed IP addresses used by the
attacker. More detailed contributions are summarized at the end of each chapter. Next, we give a
brief outline of the thesis.
1.4.4 Thesis Outline
The detection models presented in this thesis can be classified as parametric and non-parametric.
Each chapter is dedicated to a specific model. The thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 gives
an overview of some mathematical tools that are applied throughout the thesis. Chapter 3 and
4 both present parametric detection models, which are formulated as binary hypothesis detection
problems. The former describes a fixed sample detection system while the latter addresses sequential
detection. An empirical detection model, i.e., non-parametric is presented in Chapter 5. Finally,




NETWORK TRAFFIC MODELING AND METHODOLOGIES
This chapter presents the marked Poisson process used to model network traffic. It also introduces
various mathematical tools that are applied throughout the thesis.
2.1 Network Traffic Model
Understanding and modeling the behavior of network traffic is essential for developing efficient
security systems. Several network traffic models have been proposed, see [8, 129] for detailed
reviews. Wilson [129] emphasizes that packet length and packet inter-arrival distributions are the
two main characteristics of traffic models. The others, including routes, distribution of destinations
are of less importance. Various models such as Poisson [76], compound Poisson [60], Markov-
modulated Poisson [53], and Packet Trains [60] have been developed for network traffic. In this
study, we focus on packet inter-arrival distributions and model the arrival of packet flows. A packet
flow is a set of data packets exchanged between two end points [55]. More specifically,
Definition 3. A flow is a collection of data packets which share the same source/destination IP
addresses and source/destination ports. Furthermore, the interarrival time between any two data
packets cannot exceed a certain time period, here fixed as 64s [55].
Definition 4. The cluster size of a given packet flow denote the total number of data packets in
that flow.
Assuming that packet flows are statistically independent, Hohn et al. [55] introduces the Poisson
cluster process as a novel approach to modeling network traffic. Fay¨ et al. [34] provides an extensive
analysis of Poisson cluster models. In this thesis, we model legitimate network traffic as a Marked
Poisson process. Let Tj denote the random arrival time of the first data packet in each flow j.
The arrival of packet flows can be either a homogeneous or inhomogeneous Poisson process. In the
absence of a closed form for the intensity function, the latter can be approximated as a piecewise
homogeneous Poisson process. We present detection models for both instances of packet flows.
First, we address the modeling of flow size, which can be measured in number of packets or bytes.
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Figure 2.1: Histogram Small Flow Size- Auckland and W1M-MIT Datasets
2.1.1 Modeling Cluster Size
Define Kj as the random cluster size of flow j. Previous studies [99, 128] propose that network traffic
be modeled with heavy-tailed distributions that exhibit power law behavior. The two properties
are defined below [4].




θxP {X > x} =∞. (2.1.1)
Definition 6. The distribution function of a random variable X has a power law behavior if
P {X = x} = L(x)x−α, (2.1.2)
where α > 0, and L(x) is a slowly varying function, i.e., limx→∞ L(tx)L(x) = 1, for a constant t > 0.
The population of network flow sizes is non-homogeneous, suggesting mixture distributions for
cluster sizes. Power law tail behavior usually occurs far in the distribution tail. Small flow sizes
must then be modeled separately. Gonza´lez-Are´valo and Roy [48] propose to model small clusters
as a discrete uniform random variable. However, Figure 2.1 invalidates the uniform distribution
assumption. Instead, we define a discrete distribution on the set {1, 2, . . . , bc1c − 1}, c1 > 0 and
0 < q1 < 1. Note that the first packet of each flow counts as part of the cluster size.
Let {Kj}, Kj ≥ 1 ∀j, be iid mixture random variables such that
Kj =

Dj with probability q
bVic with probability q1
bWjc with probability q2 = 1− q − q1,
(2.1.3)
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where (Vj) are iid Pareto random variables with complementary cdf





)α1 for x ≥ c1
0 for x < c1,
(2.1.4)
where 0 < α1. {Wj} are defined likewise, except α2 > 0 and c2 > 0. {Dj} are iid discrete random
variables with the domain {1, 2, . . . , bc1c − 1} with probabilities p1, p2, . . . , pc1−1.
The marked Poisson process, denoted (Tj ,Kj), can be applied to model not only legitimate
traffic but also the aggregated attack traffic sent from the zombie machines in the botnet. Suppose
there are Z zombies. Independently of the total number of data packets in each flow, assume each
zombie sends attack packet flows at the constant rate of λ˜ packets per second (pps). Let p be the
probability of that one attack data packet arrives in the interval [0, t].
Lemma 1. For Z large and p small, the aggregated packet flows at the control router follows a
Poisson process with rate Zλt.
Proof. The proof follows [29]. Define Nz(t) as the number of packet flows that arrive from zombie
z in the time interval [0, t], t < 1/λ˜. Pk is the probability that k attack packet flows arrive in the
time interval [0, t], t < 1/λ˜ from Z zombies.














Recall that a DDoS attack may involve dozens, hundreds or as many as 60,000 zombies [112, 124].
So assume Z is large enough, then the binomial distribution can be approximated by a Poisson
distribution such that




The approximation holds since
E
eiθ Z∑i=1Nz(t)
 = (1− p+ peiθ)Z = (1 + p(eiθ − 1))Z
For p small and Z sufficiently large, (1 + p(eiθ − 1))Z → eZp(eiθ−1). The mean of the Poisson
distribution is approximated as Zp.
The next section shows how the marked Poisson process is extended to model and monitor the
percentage of unknown source IP addresses for each observation window.
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2.1.2 Modeling Source IP Addresses
Assume a library of known source IP addresses, denoted SIL, is built and updated regularly.
The library contains addresses with which the target network communicates the most frequently.
Additional criteria to build an effective SIL are presented in [102]. A data packet is labeled
unknown if its source IP address is not recorded in SIL. Attack data packets usually originate
from sources that are unknown to the target network. However, legitimate traffic can also have
unknown source IP addresses, e.g., a user is visiting a website for the first time.
Let ε and ς be the percentage of legitimate and attack packet flows with unknown source IP
addresses, respectively. Peng et al. [102] estimate that ε = 10 − 20%. Assume ς > ε. Define Bj
as a Bernoulli random variable with parameter ς or ε. The complete network traffic model is then
the marked Poisson process (Tj ,Kj , Bj), where Bj , Kj and Tj are mutually independent. Note
that modeling network traffic at the flow level with no cluster size implies that we monitor the
percentage of distinct unknown source IP addresses. This follows since by Definition 3, all data
packets of a given flow share the same source IP address. On the other hand, when we take into
account cluster size, every unknown source IP address is counted as such, regardless of duplicates.
Our detection models are based on the second approach, given that the former statistic can be
misleading if the attacker uses a small number of spoofed IP addresses.
The data fitting section, presented next, describes the procedure to estimate distribution pa-
rameters and provides distribution fitting results. Distribution parameters are estimated only for
legitimate traffic given that attack traffic is Monte-Carlo simulated with user-input parameters.
2.1.3 Numerical Results for Data Fitting
To identify power-law behavior in empirical data, graphical models such as Q-Q and log-log plots can
be used. Q-Q plots compare the empirical quantiles of the log-transformed data to the quantiles of
the fitted distribution. Log-log graphs use logarithmic scales to compare the estimator of a number
to its true value. If the dataset has a power law distribution, the log-log plot shows a straight line.
Hohn et al. [55] performed extensive wavelet analysis to validate the Poisson cluster model. In
this section, we present several illustrations. The first step is to test the Poisson process assumption,
for which we fit an exponential distribution to the flow inter-arrival times. Figure 2.2 illustrates
the Q-Q plot of packet flows inter-arrival times against the exponential distribution with parameter
µ = 0.0957 for the Auckland IV dataset. Moreover, figure 2.3 depicts the number of flows for every
30 minutes time intervals for the W1M-MIT dataset. Therefore, the marked Poisson model should
be considered inhomogeneous. The inhomogeneous intensity function can be approximated by a
piecewise constant function. The estimator for ζ, the rate of legitimate packet flows arrival process,
corresponds to the sample mean of flow inter-arrival times.
The next graphs illustrate that the distribution of flow cluster sizes behaves as a power law, i.e.
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Figure 2.2: QQ-Plot Inter-arrival times vs Exponential-Auckland
F¯ (x) = 1 − P {X ≤ x} ∼ x−α. Since heavy tailed distributions exhibit more variability on the
tails [38, 14], plots should then be interpreted with care. Using Kolmogorov-Smirvov tests, Clauset
et al. [22] describe a procedure to estimate the lower bound on power law behavior. The tail index
parameter α is estimated using a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE). Weron [127] emphasize
that heavy tailness may induce bias in the tail index estimation . For a vector of size n,








Alternatively, α can be measured as the slope of the log-log plot d log F¯ (x)d log x ∼ −α. Figure 2.4
illustrates log-log plots of two power laws with minimum 5, and 34 fitted to the Auckland dataset.
The corresponding tail indices are α = 1.98, 2.34, respectively.
The figures above show that power laws are a good fit for flow cluster sizes. Moreover, they
demonstrate that one power law does not fit the entire range of cluster size, therefore mixture
distributions are more appropriate. The Pareto distribution is one of the most common examples
of power-law distributions. Consider the Auckland and W1M-MIT datasets. We illustrate two
examples of Pareto distribution fitting when lower bounds are respectively set to 34 and 120.
Figure 2.5 illustrates the Q-Q plots of empirical against the Pareto distribution quantiles. The tail
indices are α = 1.434 and α = 2.185, respectively
Although these two examples imply that 1 < α < 2 or α > 2, previous studies of web traffic
[3, 24, 100, 107] demonstrate power laws with heavier tails, i.e. 0 < α < 1. We consider all three
cases in our detection models.
Based on the network model described, we develop theoretical detection models that will be
14
Figure 2.3: Packet Flow Count per 30 mns
validated by simulation. The following section provides some background on the Pareto distribution,
and the Poisson process. Additional mathematical tools used in the thesis are introduced as well.
2.2 Poisson Processes
The Poisson process is a well-known stochastic counting process used to model the times at which
certain events occur. Let N (t) denote the number of packet flow arrivals in the time interval (0, t].
If packet flows arrive at a constant rate λ > 0, {N (t), t ≥ 0} is an an homogeneous Poisson process
and the inter-arrival time between events are iid exponential random variables with probability
density function (pdf) f(x) = λe−λt, x ≥ 0. Poisson processes have stationary and independent
increment properties.




More generally, the rate of the Poisson process may vary with time; the resulting process is called





Poisson processes have multiple desirable properties including the thinning property, which
Lemma 2 illustrates. Define {U(t), t ≥ 0} and {A(t), t ≥ 0} as the counting functions associated
with the legitimate and attack packet flow with unknown source IP address, respectively.
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Figure 2.4: Power Law Fitting to Cluster Size - Auckland
Figure 2.5: QQ-Plot Pareto vs Auckland and W1M-MIT Datasets
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Lemma 2. Independently of the cluster size Kj, {U(t), t ≥ 0} is a Poisson process with rate ζε.
Similarly, {A(t), t ≥ 0} has rate λς [109].
Proof. We show the proof for U(t), the thinning property similarly applies to the counting function
A(t).
Independently of cluster sizes {Kj}, the process of legitimate packet flow, call it N (t), is the Marked
Poisson process (Tj , Bj) where the Poisson process has rate ζ and Bj ∼ B(ε) and B stands for the
Bernoulli distribution. The process U(t) has independent and stationary increments and U(0) = 0
[109]. Moreover, given that U(t) is the counting process of legitimate packet flow with unknown








































The network traffic model proposed in Section 2.1 is a marked Poisson with a Pareto and Bernoulli
marks. Given that the Bernoulli mark space is denumerable, the thinning property of Poisson
processes can be applied, as in Lemma 2, to split the packet flow traffic into two independent
processes. The two processes have unknown and known source IP addresses, respectively. Next, we
provide some background on probability theory. In subsequent sections, X represents a continuous
random variable with pdf fX(x) and cdf FX(x).
2.3 Characteristic Functions










ψX(θ) is a complex-valued function that uniquely defines the cdf FX(x). Some properties of char-
acteristic functions include the following ( [30] )
1. ψ(θ) exists for any distribution
2. ψ(0) = 1
3. If Y = aX + b then ψY (θ) = e
iaθψX(bθ)
4. If X1 and X2 are independent, then ψX1+X2(θ) = ψX1(θ)ψX2(θ)





ψX(−iθ). As opposed to the characteristic function, the mgf does not exist for certain distributions,
e.g. the Cauchy distribution.
Given the characteristic function ψ(θ), the pdf f , when it exists, is computed as the inverse
Fourier transform of ψ(θ) [30].
Theorem 1. If the characteristic function is absolutely integrable then pdf is given by the inverse








Equation (2.3.2) is very useful for random variables without a closed-form pdf. Gil-Pelaez [45]


















Waller et al. [122] provides a review of numerical methods to invert characteristic functions. Taube-
rian theorems shows that the behavior of fX(x) for x → ∞ is mainly determined by the behavior
of ψX(θ) near zero [36].
2.3.1 Pareto Distribution
This section introduces the Pareto distribution and proves that it possesses the required properties
to be adequate models for network traffic. These properties include heavy-tailness and power law
behavior, which are described in Definitions 5 and 6, respectively. The Pareto distribution is one
of the most well-known power law functions. It commonly appears in economic studies where it is
applied to describe the distribution of income [77]. A nonnegative random variable X has a Pareto
18




1 {x ≥ c} . (2.3.4)
α and c are the shape and scale parameters, respectively. X has a power law probability tail
behavior since F¯X(x) = P(X > x) = Cx−α [62]. As α decreases, the tail thickness increases.
Lemma 3 gives the Laplace transform of a Pareto random variable [89].
Lemma 3. Let X be a Pareto random variable with pdf as described in (2.3.4). The Laplace
transform of X is MX(−θ), where MX(θ) denotes the mgf of X.




















The Laplace transform (2.3.5) can be also expressed in terms of Whittaker functions [89]. The
incomplete Gamma is more convenient for our applications. Note that heavy tailness implies that
the mgf, M(θ), is infinite for all θ > 0, which is the case for the Pareto distribution.





In general, moments of order k exists only if α ≥ k [110]. This follows since the kth moment is
computed as
























The last two equalities follow from applying the change of variable y = x/c. If k < α, the limit at
∞ in (2.3.8) is zero, else it diverges.
Unless otherwise specified, subsequent sections assume that the minimum value of the Pareto
distribution is c = 1. Lemma 4 shows that any Pareto random variable can be normalized to satisfy
this condition.
Lemma 4. If X ∼ Par(α, c) then Xc ∼ Par(α, 1).
Proof. The characteristic function of a Pareto random variable can be deduced from Lemma 3 as
ψX(θ) = α(−i c θ)αΓ(−α,−ic θ). (2.3.8)












= α(−i θ)αΓ(−α,−i θ)
For detection purpose, we are interested in the sum of iid Pareto random variables. In case the
tail index satisfies 0 < α < 2, i.e. the variance is infinite, the sum can be approximated by a stable
distribution, which is described next.
2.3.2 Stable Distributions
Definition 7. A random variable X is said to have a stable distribution if there exists a sequence
of positive numbers {bn} and real numbers {an} such that
Y1 + Y2 + . . .+ Yn
bn
+ an
d⇒ X , (2.3.9)
where Yi’s are iid random variables [110].
Definition 7 indicates that the distribution of normalized sums of iid random variables can be
approximated by stable distributions [110]. An equivalent definition also due to [110] illustrates
the ”stability” property as
Definition 8. Let n ≥ 2. A random variable X is said to have a stable distribution if there exists
a positive number {bn} and a real numbers {an} such that
X1 +X2 + . . .+Xn
d⇒ bnX + an , (2.3.10)
where Xi’s are iid copies of X [110].
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In other words, the family of stable distribution is closed under convolution. Feller [36] proves
that for 0 < α ≤ 2, bn = n1/α. The univariate stable distribution Sα(γ, β, δ) is characterized by
four parameters [110]:
• α ∈ (0, 2]: index of stability
• γ > 0: scale parameter
• β ∈ [−1, 1]: skewness parameter
• δ ∈ R: location parameter
The normal distribution is a stable distribution with α = 2, in which case β is irrelevant. It is the
only stable distribution that has a finite second moment. The Levy and Cauchy distribution have
parameters α = 1/2, β = 1 and α = 1, β = 0, respectively. Only these three instances of stable




{−|θ|α [1 + iβ(sign θ)(tan piα2 ) (|θ|1−α − 1)]} if α 6= 1
exp
{−|θ| [1 + iβ(sign θ)( 2pi ) ln t]} if α = 1 (2.3.11)
Their pdf can be calculated as the inverse Fourier transform of ψS(θ) (Theorem 1).
The central limit theorem can be extended to random variables with infinite moments, where
the stable distribution represents the approximating distribution. The tails of stable distributions
decay like power law function, i.e., Pareto-like behavior [38], therefore they make good candidates
to model random variables when heavy tails are observed. The smaller the α (tail index), the
slower the decrease, and the heavier the tail [39]. Theorem 2 shows that the sum of n symmetric
Pareto random variables can be approximated by a symmetric stable distribution (β = 0, δ = 0).
A similar version of Theorem 2 is known as the Generalized Central Limit Theorem (GCLT) [119].
Theorem 2. [67] Let X1, X2, . . ., Xn be iid with a probability distribution which behaves asymp-
totically as
fX(x) ∝ C|x|1+α , (2.3.12)
where C is a constant and 0 < α < 2. Let Sn = X1 +X2 + . . . Xn then Sn ∼ Sα(γ, 0, 0)
The central limit theorem with the normal distribution does not apply when the random variables
Xi are heavy-tailed with an infinite variance. Proving Theorem 2 requires Lemma 5, which provides
the small θ expansion of the characteristic function of Xi’s.
Lemma 5. For any i, the small θ expansion of ψXi(θ) is





Γ(1 + α) sin(piα/2)
(2.3.14)










The last inequality holds since sin θx is an odd function, therefore its integral is 0 by symmetry.
Also fXi(x) is a pdf which integrates to 1. Next, perform a change of integral variable and set
y = θx ∫ ∞
−∞















(1− cos y) C|y/θ|1+αdy






Using the property of the cosine function that cos(2x) = cos2(x)−sin2(x) and cos2(x)+sin2(x) = 1,
write



































dν = −2Γ(−α) cos(αpi
2
)
Applying Euler’s reflexion formula, i.e., Γ(1− z)Γ(z) = pisin(piz) , rewrite Γ(−α) = − pisin(piα) 1Γ(1+α) .













(1− cos θx)fK(x)dx = C˜|θ|α
Given 0 < α < 2, (2.3.13) follows.
The proof of Theorem 2 follows since





which is the characteristic function of symmetric α-stable distributions [36]. If α > 2, (2.3.13) is
not a characteristic function; a proof can be found in [67].
The next sections present some approximation techniques that can be used to compute the pdf
of a random variable with known characteristic function.
2.4 Saddlepoint Approximation
Let X be a random variable. If its mgf MX(θ) is known, the pdf fX(x) can approximated by





where sˆ is the saddlepoint which satisfies KX(sˆ) = lnMX(sˆ) = x.



















where KX(θ) is the cumulant generating function of X and satisfies KX(θ) = lnMX(θ). By the
Closed Curve Theorem, the choice of τ can be arbitrary since the integral (2.4.3) is the same over
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all paths that are parallel to the imaginary axis in a neighborhood of zero where MX(θ) exists
[49]. The pdf fX can then be approximated by choosing the path of integration to pass through
a saddlepoint sˆ which satisfies K′X(sˆ) = x. In other words, choose τ in (2.4.3) to be τ = sˆ. Note
that sˆ is a function of x. The integrand is negligible outside the immediate neighborhood of sˆ [25].
Therefore it is sufficient to use the Taylor expansion of KX(θ)−θx around the saddlepoint sˆ, which
is




The linear term in the expansion vanishes given that sˆ is an extremum for KX(θ)− θx. The next
step consists of substituting the exponent (2.4.4) in (2.4.3) and integrating with respect to θ along







a leads to the desired approximation [132].
If the saddlepoint method is used to approximate the pdf of X¯ = 1n
∑n
i=1Xi then the approxima-
tion presents a relative error of order O(1/n), which can be reduced to O(n−3/2) by normalized the
resulting pdf so that it integrates to one. It is a very accurate approximation which achieves high





Let the cumulant generating function be
KX(t) = lnMX(t) = 1
2
t2 (2.4.6)
The first and second derivatives, K′X(t) and K′′X(t) are respectively t and 1.
Solving K′X(t) = x gives t∗ = x.
The saddle point approximation is given by
fX(x) ≈ 1√
2piK′′X(t∗)


















However, applying the higher order does not necessarily improve the approximation. In fact, the
approximated pdf may ”explode” , i.e. reach very large values [46].
Lugannani and Rice [75] applied the saddlepoint approximation technique to determine the tail












3/2 x = E[Y˜ ]
(2.4.9)













(sˆ) if x is continuous(
1− e−sˆ)√K′′
Y˜
(sˆ) if x is discrete
(2.4.11)
Note that if y = E[Y˜ ], then K′
Y˜
(0) = E[Y˜ ] and sˆ = 0 is the saddle point for E[Y˜ ] [17]. In that
case wˆ = 0 and F¯X(x) must be approximated otherwise, hence the second formula. Wood et al.
[131] extend this result to allow general base distributions other than the normal distribution. The
saddlepoint approximation method does not always apply, especially when the pdf is heavy-tailed
with infinite variance. An efficient alternative method is the Fast Fourier Transform, which is
presented in the next section.
2.5 Fast Fourier Transform (FFT)
Consider that the pdf fX of a random variable X has to be approximated on the interval [a, b]. X




and fX is the inverse Fourier transform of ψX(θ) (see
(2.3.2)). The pdf of any random variable with known characteristic function can be approximated
using the FFT method. Given that all random variables possess a characteristic function, the
method has a wide range of application. FFT method is particularly useful when the characteristic
function has a very complex form such that analytical results are difficult to derive.
Hu¨rlimann [57] presents an FFT method combined with quadrature approximations. The ap-
proach requires to partition [a, b] into N equally spaced subintervals of length h = (b− a)/N . Let
c = pi/h and xk = a + hk for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. For a random variable X, the characteristic
function and the Fourier transform fˆ satisfy ψX(−2piθ) = fˆ(θ). Therefore, given N sufficiently
















The density function fX is obtained by numerically inverting the characteristic function ψX ,
which is approximated by the Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT). When N is defined as a power
of two, then the FFT algorithm can be applied to compute the DFT. The detailed procedure is
described in the appendix. The cumulative distribution function of X is computed recursively asFX(xk) = 0 k = 0FX(xk) = FX(xk−1) + hfX(xk−1) k = 1, 2, . . . , N − 1. (2.5.2)
Note that interpolation can be used to obtain values between the points xk. Numerical rounding
errors can occur and the results may contain complex components, in which case, only the real
components must be taken into consideration [32]. For a discussion on the accuracy of the FFT
approximations based on the discrete total variation distance see [57]. To achieve better approxima-
tions, exponential tilting may be used prior to applying the FFT algorithm [32, 111]. Alternatively,
the grid size N can be increased to the expense of higher computational costs. Another method is
the ”padding by zeros” technique which consists of setting elements of the vector to zero [111].
So far we have described different techniques to approximate pdfs. These tools are to used to
solve our DDoS detection problem which can be formulated as a binary hypothesis problem. The
next section gives an overview of detection theory.
2.6 Detection Theory
Detection theory, as the name indicates, comprises tools to detect an information of interest dis-
torted by some random patterns called noise. Applications include target detection, signal process-
ing, biomedecin, and communication [103]. Detection problems can usually be formulated using
hypothesis testing, as shown below.
2.6.1 Hypothesis Testing
A binary hypothesis test, with state space j ∈ X = {0, 1}, consists of evaluating observations Y1,
Y2, . . ., Yn ∼ f(y|θ) to determine which of the following hypothesis holdsH0 : θ ∈ Θ0H1 : θ ∈ Θ1 (2.6.1)
H0 is known as the null hypothesis and H1 is the alternative hypothesis. If the set Θ contains a
single element, then the corresponding hypothesis is qualified as simple, otherwise it is composite.
In our DDoS detection case, H0 would be the hypothesis that only legitimate packet flows are
observed, while H1 would be a combination of attack and legitimate packet flows. The definition
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of H1 takes into account the fact that legitimate users continue to access the victim network while
the attack is taking place.
Let Y be the space of possible observations {Yi}. The testing procedure involves partitioning the
observation space Y into two mutually exclusive regions, the rejection R and acceptance A regions
[88]. If an observation Yi falls into R, then Yi is said to be a threat and an alarm is triggered, else
Yi is labeled as legitimate and no further action is taken. In binary hypothesis testing, two error
probabilities can occur.
Definition 9. The type I error probability, also known as the probability of false alarm, is defined
as PFA = P {Decide H1|H0 is true}.
The type II error probability, i.e. PFC = P {Decide H0|H1 is true}, is the probability of false clear
or miss.
In testing two simple hypothesis, the Neyman-Pearson test can be applied to identify the regions
R and A. Let fY |H0(y) and fY |H1(y) be the conditional pdfs under H0 and H1, respectively. The





Definition 10. Let ϕ be a fixed limit on the probability of false alarm. The Neyman-Pearson test
rejects H0 if L(y) > η. The threshold η is chosen in order to minimize ϕ under the constraint that
ξ does not exceed a predetermined limit.
In general, practical application of hypothesis testing will require both error probabilities ϕ and
ξ to be small, i.e., ϕ, ξ ∈ [0.01, 0.05] [121]. However, a tradeoff must be made between the false
alarm and false clear probabilities. The performance of a particular detector can be measured based
on the values of these error probabilities. For hypothesis testing with no closed-form pdf or very
complex pdfs, ϕ and ξ cannot be determined analytically. In that case, large deviation theory can
be applied to computed upper bounds on these error probabilities. The next section defines such a
procedure.
2.6.2 Large Deviations
Large deviation theory is concerned with the behavior of the probability P {X > x} when x→∞.
These results apply to detection problems to measure the type I and type II error probabilities.
When it is impossible to compute the exact probabilities, large deviation bounds provide upper
limits on the probabilities of false alarms and false clear (see Definition 9). One of the most
famous large deviation result is the Chernoff bound. The latter is an extension of the Markov’s
and Chebyshev’s inequalities, which are introduced next.
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For a given nonnegative random variable X and a constant b > 0, Markov’s inequality is given
as
P {Z > b} ≤ E[Z]
b
. (2.6.3)
Given c, a positive constant, the Chebyshev’s inequality follows by applying the Markov’s Inequality







≤ c−2 , (2.6.4)
The Markov’s and Chebyshev’s inequalities are usually loose bounds, therefore a tighter exponential
bound is introduced by Chernoff. The main difference between Markov’s Inequality and Chernoff
bounds is that the latter relies on the moment generating function of the random variable of
interest, whereas the former uses only the mean of the distribution. Since the mgf encodes the
entire probability distribution, Chernoff bounds are tighter (if the mgf is finite).
Let Z = esX be a nonnegative random variable and b = esa, for a ∈ R; the variable s is a free
parameter that has to be optimized. Given s > 0, the function esa is increasing and the exponential
bound is deduced from Markov’s inequality as
P {X > a} = P{esX > esa} ≤ E [esX]
esa
. (2.6.5)




. As mentioned earlier, define the
cgf of X as KX(s) = lnMX(s). Then the tightest exponential upper bound is achieved for sˆ > 0,
where sˆ maximizes the function ga(s) = sa − K(s). Note that ga(0) = 0 and g′a(0) = a − E[X],





The function ga(s) is concave since sa and −KX(s) are both concave. Therefore finding the optimal
sˆ for (2.6.6) reduces to solving a concave optimization problem. If the resulting supremum is
positive, i.e. sˆ > 0, then the upper bound is
P {X > a} ≤ e−g∗(a) (2.6.7)
Else if sˆ < 0 then P {X < a} ≤ e−g∗(a).
Cramer Theorem extends these results to deduce bounds on the tail probability of the sum of n
iid random variables [88].
Theorem 4 (Cramer-Chernoff Theorem). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be iid with common mgfMX(θ) <∞
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Equation (2.6.9) indicates that large deviation probabilities converge exponentially to zero.
Note that Cramer’s bound (2.6.8) as given in Theorem 4 is relevant only if I(a) > 0. The latter
condition is satisfied if a > E[X] and MX(θ) < ∞ for some θ > 0. In other words, the tail of X
must decay exponentially. In some of our applications, the random variable of interest has a heavy




=∞ for θ > 0.
Therefore, the standard Cramer-Chernoff bound is not applicable.
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CHAPTER 3
FIXED SAMPLE DETECTION MODEL
In this chapter, the DDoS detection model is formulated as a fixed sample binary hypothesis testing
problem where the threshold is selected according to the Neyman-Pearson criterion. Let Y be the
percentage of new source IP address in a given observation window of length T . Two cases are
addressed: Y counts the number of distinct unknown source IP addresses or the total number of
unknown source IP addresses, regardless of duplicates. As described in Section 2.1, the arrival of
data packets is modeled as a Marked Poisson process.
For detection purpose, we are interested in asymptotic tails and quantiles estimation. Let fY and
FY denote the pdf and cdf of Y , respectively. Let ϕ ∈ (0, 1) be the limit on the probability of false
alarms (PFA). Assume the Neyman-Pearson test, introduced in Definition 10, can be expressed in
terms of the observation Y = y. Then η, the Neyman-Pearson threshold corresponds to the (1−ϕ)-
quantile of the distribution function of Y , i.e. F−1Y (1− ϕ). Note that as ϕ→ 0, the corresponding
quantile y → ∞ [13]. For large y, the behavior of the pdf fY (y) is mostly determined by that of
the characteristic function ψY (θ) when θ is small [64, 67]. Therefore, subsequent sections put an
emphasis on evaluating the small θ expansion of characteristic functions. The first section addresses
the case of monitoring the percentage of distinct unknown source IP addresses.
3.1 Distinct Source IP Statistic
Suppose we are concerned with the percentage of distinct unknown source IP addresses [101].
Thus, cluster size of packet flows are irrelevant since all data packets in the same flow have the
same source IP address. Therefore, the ”reduced” marked Poisson model is (Tj , Bj) where Bj and
Tj are independent. Tj denotes the random arrival times of packet flow j and Bj is the Bernoulli
mark such that Bj = 0 if the source IP of flow j is recorded into SIL (known), else Bj = 1
(unknown). Suppose that a total of M packet flows are observed during the time interval of length






where Y represents the number of packet flows with distinct unknown source IP addresses in the
observation interval. Y is a Poisson process, which can be homogeneous or inhomogeneous. The
next two sections present DDoS detection models for both cases.
3.1.1 Homogeneous Flow Arrival
Assume the counting process of legitimate and attack packet flows are homogeneous Poisson pro-
cesses with rates ζ and λ, respectively. Applying the thinning property of Poisson processes (see
Lemma 2) shows that the legitimate and attack packet flows with unknown source IP addresses are
also homogeneous Poisson processes with rates ζε and λς, respectively. Recall ε and ς are the fixed
percentages of unknown source IP addresses for the legitimate and attack processes, respectively
and ε ' 10 − 20% [102]. Detecting a DDoS attack can be formulated as the following binary
hypothesis H0 : Y ∼ Poisson with intensity (ζε)TH1 : Y ∼ Poisson with intensity (ζε+ λς)T . (3.1.2)
The first hypothesis denotes the case where only legitimate traffic is observed. H1 is the alternative
hypothesis of having an attack underway. The attack and legitimate packet flows are assumed to
be independent.
Let L = ζε+λς, the likelihood ratio corresponding to the binary hypothesis problem formulated
in (3.1.2 ) is
L(y) =
P {Y = y|H1}
P {Y = y|H0} , (3.1.3)
where
P {Y = y|H1} = e−LT (LT )
y
y!










Define PD and PFA as the probabilities of detection (power test) and false alarm (FA), respec-
tively. The Neyman-Pearson (NP) test [103] seeks a threshold η such that
PFA = P {L(y) > η|H0} = ϕ (3.1.5)





(ln η + (L− ζε)T )× ln ζε
lnL
= η˜ . (3.1.6)
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Given ϕ the fixed limit on PFA, the NP threshold η must be selected such that
P {Y > η˜|H0} = 1− P {Y ≤ η˜|H0} = ϕ (3.1.7)
Given H0, Y is Poisson distributed with rate ζεT . The Poisson cdf is not invertible, therefore
the NP threshold, η, must be computed numerically. Alternatively, assume ζεT , the mean of the
Poisson distribution under H0, is large. Then, the Poisson distribution can be approximated by a
normal distribution with mean and variance both equal to ζεT . Therefore,









And we reject H0 if Y ≥ ζεT + zϕ
√
ζεT , where zϕ is the normal quantile that corresponds to the
limit on type I error probability (ϕ).
The Poisson process of packet flows may have a rate that varies with time. The case is illustrated
in Figure 2.3 (see Section 2.1.3). The next section addresses this particular case.
3.1.2 Inhomogeneous Flow Arrival
Assume the counting process of legitimate and attack packet flows are inhomogeneous Poisson
processes with intensity function ζ(t) and λ(t), respectively. The thinning property of Poisson
processes also applies when rates are functions of time. Let Λ0(t) = ζ(t)ε and Λ1(t) = ζ(t)ε+λ(t)ς,
with 0 ≤ t ≤ T , be the intensity functions under H0 and H1, respectively. When the Poisson
intensities are known, the sample-function density can be used to formulate the hypothesis testing
problem [88]. Let N be the number of events in the time interval of length T and denote T1 <
T2 < . . . < TN the random arrival times of packet flows. Then, the joint density of N and {Ti} is









where Λ(t) is the intensity function of the Poisson process, n = 0, 1, . . . and 0 < t1 < t2 < . . . <
tn < T . The function y(t) =
∑n
i=1 1 {t ≥ ti} corresponds to the counting function with n jumps




P {N = n, t1, t2, . . . , tn|H1}










































κ = ln η +
∫ T
0
[Λ1(t)− Λ0(t)] dt (3.1.9)
Note that the intensity function of the inhomogeneous Poisson processes (packet flows process)
can be approximated as piecewise constant function. So the procedure described for homogeneous
Poisson processes in Section 3.1.1 can be applied as well. Detection error probabilities can be
bounded using Chernoff inequalities.
3.1.3 Chernoff Bounds on Detection Error Probabilities
As mentioned in Section 2.6.2, error probabilities can be bounded using large deviation theory.
Since Y represents the percentage of distinct new source IP addresses, Y has a finite variance, its
mgf is well defined for θ > 0 and Chernoff bounds can be computed. Analytical bounds on the
probability errors can be derived as follows:
Proposition 1. The probabilities of false alarm and false clear are bounded above as
PFA = P {Y > η˜|H0} ≤ e
−ζεT (eζεT )η˜
η˜η˜
, η˜ > ζεT (3.1.10)
PFC = P {Y < η˜|H1} ≤ e
−LT (eLT )η˜
η˜η˜
, η˜ > LT (3.1.11)
Proof. Under H0, Y follows a Poisson distribution with parameter ζεT . Let MY (θ) denote the
moment generating function of Y .
MY (s) = eζεT (es−1)
The exponential upper bound is given as [88]
P {Y > y} ≤ e−sy−lnMY (s), s > 0, y ∈ R.
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Let gy(s) , sy − ζεT (es − 1).
Solving for the optimal sˆ requires finding the maximum of gy(s). The derivative is g
′
y(s) = y−ζεes.






From (2.6.7), deduce that




















Equations (3.1.10) follow by the Neyman-Pearson test defined in (3.1.6).
This section has presented a detection system which monitors the distinct number of unknown IP
addresses. Subsequent sections in this chapter introduce a detection system that counts the total
number of data packets with unknown source IP address, regardless of duplicates. The second
statistic does not depend on the number of spoofed source IP addresses used by the attacker, which
is an improvement over the former statistic.
3.2 Marked Poisson with Pareto Cluster Size
The DDoS detection model presented in this section monitors the percentage of unknown source IP
addresses by counting individual data packets rather than flows. Network traffic is modeled as the
marked Poisson process (Tj ,Kj , Bj) where Bj , Kj and Tj are mutually independent. The thinning





, where T˜j now represents the random arrival times of packet flow j with unknown source
IP address. As in Section 3.1.1, consider that the counting process of legitimate (U(t)) and attack
A(t) packet flows are homogeneous Poisson processes with rates ζε and λς, respectively.
Assume flow cluster sizes, {Kj}, are iid Pareto random variables. The sum of n iid Pareto random
is dominated by their maximum, i.e.,
lim
k→∞
P {K1 + . . .+Kn > k}
P {max {K1 + . . .+Kn} > x} ≈ 1 (3.2.1)
By definition, the distribution of cluster sizes (see Section 2.1) has a heavy tail. Equation (3.2.1)
indicates that the sum of cluster sizes will be dominated by large rather than small cluster sizes.
Therefore, as a first step, we assume that cluster sizes are iid Pareto random variables. The case
of mixture distribution will be addressed later.
The DDoS detection problem is formulated as a binary hypothesis problem (see 3.1.2). However,
the total number of data packets with unknown source IP addresses, i.e. Y =
∑
Kj , is now a com-
pound Poisson random variable [114]. The objective of the detection model is to derive an optimal
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likelihood-ratio test for differentiating two compound Poisson processes, given the percentage of
unknown source IP addresses observed in a fixed time interval of length T . A decision, attack or
legitimate, has to be made at the end of the observation period.
Let Kj ∼ Par(α0, c0) and Kj ∼ Par(α, c), given H0 and H1, respectively. With proper nor-
malization, Lemma 4 shows that the scale parameters of the two Pareto distribution can be set
to c0 = c = 1. Also, set N (T ) = U(T ) + A(T ), where U(t) and A(t) denote the legitimate and
attack processes with unknown source IP addresses, respectively. The conditional pdfs defining the
likelihood ratio in (4.1) become





 , N (T ) ∼ Pois(LT ), Kj ∼ Par(α, 1)





 , U(T ) ∼ Pois(ζεT ), Kj ∼ Par(α0, 1)
The next step in the detection procedure is to evaluate the pdfs fY (y) above and deduce the
Neyman-Pearson threshold. The random variable Y is a random sum of iid Pareto random variables.
The limited literature expresses how challenging it is to compute the sum of n iid Pareto random
variables. We present a brief overview of different proposed methods. Recall the pdf of a Pareto





where x ≥ c > 0.
Assuming that random variables {Xi} are iid Pareto random variables with tail index and scale
parameters α = c = 1, Hagstroem [52] computes the closed form for the convolution of n = 2 and
n = 3 Pareto random variables. Additional analytical expression of the sum of n iid Pareto random














Γ(m+ αj + 1)
xm+αj+1
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m = (1F1(−α, 1− α, t))k.















where L(x) is a slowly varying function, which by definition means for a given constant t > 0,
L(tx)
L(x) → 1 as x → ∞. Roehner and Winiwarter [108] also introduce the stable distribution as the
asymptotic density of the normalized sum of n iid Pareto random variables as n→∞.
Each method presented so far considers that n, the number of summands, is deterministic.
Assuming the number of summands is random, Ramsay [106] addresses the case of the compound
Poisson-Pareto distribution. Let Y =
∑N
i=1Xi, where {Xi} are iid Pareto and N ∼ Pois(λ). The
expression of the right tail distribution of Y is given as







eλR(z,α) sin(λI(z, α))dz, (3.2.4)
where
R(z, γ) =
−γe−zEiα+1(z) if α = 1, 2, . . .M(1; 1− α;−z)− I(z, α) cot(piα) if α 6= 1, 2, . . .




(α− 1) . . . (α− r) ,
















(r −m+ 1)r! , (3.2.5)
where γ is the Euler constant.
The methods presented above are very involved and computationally arduous. Next, we present
simpler and efficient methods for approximating the pdf of the compound Poisson- Pareto random
variable Y . For detection purposes, we are particularly interested in large deviations. This allows
some simplifications over the explicit formula in (3.2.4). Tail probabilities can be obtained by direct
approximation or by numerical integration of the pdf. Recall the Poisson process has different
intensity depending on the hypothesis H0 or H1. We present the approximation procedures for the
latter, the former case is similar. Note that the approximation methods depend on the value of the
Pareto tail index (α).
3.2.1 Effect of Randomness due to Poisson
Compound random variables do not have a closed-form pdf and should be evaluated through
their characteristic functions. In this section, flow cluster sizes are assumed to be (pure) Pareto
distributed, thus have characteristic function ψK(θ) = α(−i c θ)αΓ(−α,−ic θ). Lemma 6 determines




Lemma 6. The characteristic function of Y is
ψY (θ) = exp {αLT (−i c θ)αΓ(−α,−ic θ)− LT} (3.2.6)
Proof. Cluster size Kj ’s are iid then by conditioning on N (T ),
























{ψK (θ)}n (LT )
n
n!
= exp {LT [ψK (θ)− 1]}
and the result follows from replacing ψK (θ) by its value.
The compound random variable Y =
N (T )∑
j=1
Ki has two sources of randomness, the random cluster
sizes and the random number of summands. First, we study the effect of the randomness due to
the Poisson component, particularly when the rate of the Poisson process is very large.
Recall under hypothesis H1, N (T ) ∼ Pois(LT ). For LT sufficiently large, the Poisson distribution
can be approximated by a normal distribution with mean and variance both equal to LT . That is,
N (T ) ≈ LT +√LT N, where N is a standard normal random variable. Evaluating the ”effect of








Ki, for LT →∞.













The proof of Theorem 5 requires the small θ expansion of the Pareto characteristic function,
ψK(θ), given in Lemma 7 [108].






Near zero, the characteristic function of the normalized cluster size Kˆj expands as


























+ . . .
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The next step is to expand the incomplete Gamma and exponential function around zero. Γ(a, z)
admits two series expansion, which both converge unless a is a negative integer [97, 130].






Further details about expansions of the incomplete Gamma function can be found in [2, 10, 11, 42,













' 1 + α(−iθ)αΓ(−α)− α
α− 1(−iθ) + . . .















+ . . .
Equation (3.2.8) then follows.


































The conditional characteristic function in (3.2.11) can be rewritten as
E
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Using the small θ expansion of the characteristic function in Lemma 7, we deduce that






























+ . . .+ α
(−iθ)α
LT




+ . . .
The last expression follows from letting LT →∞ and applying the Taylor expansion of the natural
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Note that, fY , the pdf of Y can be approximated by applying the inverse Fourier transform
method to the characteristic function in (3.2.13). The latter is equivalent to the characteristic
function of a stable distribution. Theorem 2 shows that the limiting distribution of the sum of
n iid symmetric Pareto random variable is a stable distribution. The next section extend results
from [108, 110] to show that the sum of a random number of iid (non-symmetric) Pareto random
variables can be approximated with a stable distribution as well.
3.2.2 Stable Distribution as a Limiting Distribution
Let N (T ) be a Poisson random variable, the next two theorems show that the asymptotic distri-
bution of the normalized sum of N (T ) iid Pareto with tail index 0 < α < 2 is a stable distribution.
The cases 0 < α < 1 and 0 < α < 2 must be treated separately.





where Kj is a Pareto random variable, Kj ∼ Par(α, 1). If LT → ∞, the distribution of the
normalized number of unknown source IP addresses, i.e. the compound random variable Y˜ =∑N (T )
j=1 K˜j , can be approximated by a stable distribution.
40









































































































































Let Kj ∼ Par(α, 1). If 1 < α < 2, for any flow j the expected value of the cluster size is
µK = E[Kj ] =
α
α− 1 . (3.2.18)








Given H1, the expected number of packet flows with unknown source IP addresses in the time
inverval of length T is E[N (T ) = U(T ) + A(T )] = LT . Then (3.2.19) follows by Wald’s identity,
i.e., E[Y ] = E[N (T )]E[Kj ] = LTE[Kj ]. Furthermore, Lemma 7 shows that if θ → 0, then
ψK(θ) = 1 + α(−iθ)αΓ(−α)− α
α− 1(−iθ) + . . . (3.2.20)
Using (3.2.20), Theorem 7 gives the limiting distribution of Y˜ .
Theorem 7. Consider the normalized number of data packets with unknown source IP address in
(3.2.19). If LT →∞ then
ψ
Y˜
(θ) = exp {α(−iθ)αΓ(−α)} . (3.2.21)
Formula (3.2.21) corresponds to the characteristic function of a stable distribution with tail index











(|θ|1−α − 1)]} , (3.2.22)
with parameters γα = αΓ(−α) cos αpi2 , β = 1, and δ = 0.




















If LT → ∞ then θ
(LT )1/α
→ 0 and we can replace ψK by its small θ expansion given in (3.2.20).
































α(−iθ)αΓ (−α) + α
α− 1(iθ) (LT )
1− 1
α + . . .
}
,
where µK is given by (4.4.1). Then (3.2.21) follows. Feller [36] shows that (−iθ)α = θαe−iαpi2 , which
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Figure 3.1: Convergence Sum Paretos to Stable
leads to (3.2.22).
Remark 1. With the CLT, the convergence of the sum of n iid random variables to the Gaussian
distribution is generally achieved for n > 30. However with heavy tails the convergence is much
slower, in some case, n must be greater than 10000 [134].
Figure 3.1 illustrates Remark 1 with Poisson rate LT = 30, 20000, respectively. As LT increases,
the stable distribution becomes a better approximation.
If the Pareto tail index satisfies α > 2, the standard CLT with the normal distribution applies.
Note that the normal distribution itself is a stable distribution with α = 2. The next section
presents the procedure to approximate the distribution function of the stable distribution and the
compound Pareto when the tail index α > 2.
3.2.3 Density Estimation and Saddlepoint Approximations
Stable distributions with tail index satisfying 0 < α < 2 do not have a closed-form density function.
The only exceptions are the Levy, Cauchy and Normal distributions, which have tail index α = 12 ,
α = 1 and α = 2, respectively. Approximation methods to estimate the pdf of stable distributions
include numerical integration [93, 94], Fast Fourier transform (FFT) [85], and Laguerre quadrature
[9]. The pdf can be also numerically approximated from the characteristic function using the
FFT approach described in Section 2.5 [57]. This technique is developed based on characteristic
functions and does not make any assumption about the packet flow rate or the length of the
observation window. Figure 3.2 illustrates the stable pdf approximated by FFT.
As an alternative to these techniques, we propose the method of saddlepoint approximation to
compute f
Y˜
(y). Daniels [25] introduces the saddlepoint method to approximate the distribution
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Figure 3.2: FFT Approximation of the Stable Pdf with α = 1.3
of the sample mean of n iid random variables and proves it to be very effective even for small n.
The technique can be adapted to deduce the distribution of one random variable [49] in this case
the stable distribution. Lemma 8 provides the Laplace transformM
Y˜
(−θ), where Y˜ represents the
normalized number of data packets with unknown source IP addresses [110].
Lemma 8. The Laplace transform of Y˜ is
M
Y˜
(−θ) = exp {−θαΓ(1− α)} , θ > 0 . (3.2.23)













































The last equality follows by performing the change of variable t = θx.
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Proposition 2. The pdf f
Y˜
(y) can be approximated via saddlepoint approximation as follows
f
Y˜
(y) ≈ exp {−Γ(1− α)(−sˆ)
α − ysˆ}√































(θ) = −(−θ)αΓ(1 − α) be the cgf of Y˜ . From Lemma 8, deduce that
M
Y˜
(θ) = exp {−(−θ)αΓ(1− α)}. Given that 0 < α < 1, all moments of Y˜ are infinite and the mgf
is defined only for θ < 0.
Applying Taylor expansion around the saddlepoint sˆ of the function K
Y˜
(θ)− θy shows that
K
Y˜
(θ)− θy ' K
Y˜






The saddlepoint equation to solve is
K′
Y˜
(sˆ) = y , αΓ(1− α)(−sˆ)α−1 = y
This yields the saddlepoint (3.2.26).
Next, replace the exponent with its Taylor expansion in the integral above. Then integrate with
respect to θ.
The second derivative of the cgf is K′′
Y˜
(θ) = −α(α− 1)(−θ)α−2Γ(1− α). Therefore, the first order
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(sˆ)− ysˆ} , (3.2.28)
which gives the desired result (3.2.25).
Remark 2. The saddlepoint (3.2.26) is always negative and therefore well defined on the domain
of the mgf. The same approximation method applies for the case of the stable distribution with tail





The graphs 3.3 illustrate the accuracy of the saddlepoint approximation by comparing the ap-
proximated pdf to the simulated stable pdf with the same parameters. Note that the saddlepoint
approximation is virtually the same as the exact stable density when α = 0.5. Computational
difficulties may arise as α→ 1. The reason being that the Gamma function Γ(z) has a simple pole
at z = 0. As α→ 1, Γ(1−α)→∞ and the saddlepoint tail may decrease faster than the real tail.
In this section, the saddlepoint approximation is applied to estimate distribution of the compound
Pareto when the tail index is greater than 2. Section 2.4 introduces the saddlepoint approximation
method as a mean to evaluate the sum of n iid random variables. Although the number of summands
is random in our case, the saddlepoint method still applies [41, 61, 66]. When the tail index of
cluster size satisfies α > 2, then the variance exists and is finite and the saddlepoint approximation
is well defined.
Proposition 3 shows the procedure to approximate the normalized distribution P {Y = y|H1};
steps to determine P {Y = y|H0} are similar. First, recall L = ζε+λς is the intensity of the Poisson
process and denotes the rate of packet flow with unknown source IP addresses under H1. Further-
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more, the characteristic function of a Pareto random variable is ψK(θ) = α(−i c θ)αΓ(−α,−ic θ).
Thus,
ψY (θ) = exp {LT [α(−iθ)αΓ (−α,−iθ)− 1]} (3.2.29)
Proposition 3. Let Y¯ = 1LT
∑N (T )





exp {LT [ψK(−isˆ)− ysˆ− 1]} , (3.2.30)
where the saddlepoint sˆ satisfies the equation
ψ′K(−isˆ) = iy , −α2(−sˆ)α−1Γ (−α,−sˆ)− α
esˆ
(sˆ)
= y , (3.2.31)
and






































where the last equality follows by letting t = θLT . The Taylor expansion of the function ψK(t)−1−ty
around the saddlepoint sˆ is




The linear term in the expansion vanishes given that sˆ is an extremum for the function ψK(t)−1−ty.











Choosing τ = sˆ, letting x = t − sˆ, and using ∫∞−∞ e−ax2 = √pia leads to (3.2.30). The saddlepoint
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equation is derived from the Pareto characteristic function.
ψ′K(θ) = α
2(−i)(−iθ)α−1Γ (−α,−iθ) + α(−iθ)αi e
iθ
(−iθ)1+α
Use the property that ψ(−iθ) =M(θ), write




where sˆ is the saddlepoint we seek to satisfy the equation
ψ′K(−isˆ) = iy (3.2.34)
The result follows.
A closed form solution to the saddlepoint equation (3.2.34) can not be determined. When the
saddlepoint equation is intractable as it is with the Pareto distribution, Easton and Ronchetti [31]
recommends applying a Taylor expansion to the cdf around at 0











using the first four cumulants. The resulting saddlepoint equation, K˜′X(θ) = y, is a polynomial
equation of degree four which must be solve numerically. Wang [125] improves Ronchetti’s method
to prevent the saddlepoint equation from generating multiple roots. The modification is as follows














where gb(s) = exp
{−κ2b2s2/2} with b > 0.






















[47] proves that Lieberman’s expansion does not always yield accurate results when y increases and
proposes instead.




















Ohman-Strickland and Casella [96] compares the performances of these approximations in terms
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of relative errors. As shown above, they involve the first four cumulants of the distribution under
consideration. Applying those in the Pareto case requires that the tail index satisfies α > 4. We
choose to compute the saddlepoint numerically using a root finder. The cgf must be convex so that
there is a unique saddlepoint. It also implies that the saddlepoint is real. [25]. Figure 3.4 illustrates
the compound Poisson-Pareto pdf approximated by the normalized saddlepoint method when the
tail index α = 3.45.
Figure 3.4: Pareto Pdf Simulation vs Saddlepoint Approximation - Alpha 3.45
As the saddlepoint sˆ gets closed to 0, which happens when y → µK in (3.2.30), an approximated
closed form solution can be found to solve the saddlepoint equation (3.2.34).
Proposition 4. As y → µK in (3.2.30), the saddlepoint sˆ can be approximated as
sˆ =
(





with y˜ = yα .
Proof. The proof follows from expanding the exponential and gamma terms around 0 in (3.2.34).
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The Taylor expansion of the exponential function as x→ 0 is
ex ' 1 + x+ x
2
2!
+ . . . ,
while the Incomplete Gamma function admits the expansion









+ . . . ,
when z → 0. In the equation below, replace the gamma and exponential function by the expressions
above



















(−isˆ) = iy to obtain (4).
These approximations were computed under the assumption that the rate of the Poisson process
is large. When LT is small, one must be careful about the point mass at N (T ) = 0 when using
saddlepoint approximations. In fact, the compound random variable Y is not continuous atN (T ) =
0. Define Y ∗ as the continuous compound random variable. Lemma gives its characteristic function.
Lemma 9.
ψY ∗(θ) =
exp {LT [α(−iθ)αΓ (−α,−iθ)− 1]} − e−LT
1− e−LT (3.2.36)
Proof. Jensen [61] proposes to condition on the value of N (T ) to compute ψY ∗(θ).






eθY |N (T ) > 0
]
P {N (T ) > 0}+ P {N (T ) = 0}
= ψY ∗(θ)
(
1− e−LT )+ e−LT
Replace ψY (θ) by its value in (3.2.29) and (3.2.36) follows.
When LT is large, using the mgf (3.2.36) instead of (3.2.29) does not have much impact on the
approximated saddlepoint pdf. However, when LT is small, the modification improves the approx-
imation. For example, when LT = 10, P {N (T ) = 0} = e−LT ' 0.0000454, which is negligeable.
However when LT = 2, P {N (T ) = 0} = e−LT ' 0.135, and cannot be ignored.
Remark 3. Few remarks are in order:
• saddlepoint approx works very well even for very small values of LT...e.g. LT=10
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• The greater the tail index, the more accurate the saddlepoint approximation is because second
and higher moment exists.
• The numerical results section proves that the saddlepoint approximation is accurate for α >
2.8. In other words, the tail approximation with the saddlepoint method does not require that
the third or fourth moment exist.
• When α is close to 2, the saddlepoint approximation can be improved by increasing the in-
tensity function of the Poisson process eg LT = 80 produces better results than LT = 60 for
α = 2.8.
The saddlepoint approximation method requires that the Laplace transform of the random vari-
able exists in a neighborhood of zero. For heavy-tail distributions with infinite variance, in this
case the Pareto with tail index 1 < α < 2, this assumption fails [61]. In fact, as the saddlepoint sˆ
gets closed to zero (which happens when y → E[Y ]), the second derivative of the cgf, i.e. K′′(sˆ),
tends to ∞. This causes the saddlepoint tail to decreases faster than what heavy-tail requires. As
illustrated in Figure...the saddlepoint approximation works only when y < µK .
As illustrated in Proposition 3, the pdf of compound random variable can be written in its
approximated version using saddlepoint approximation. This greatly simplifies the expression of
likelihood ratio test. The next section presents the approach.
3.2.4 Application of Saddlepoint Approximation to Hypothesis Testing
Following the procedure described in Proposition 3, the distribution of Y , given H0, can be esti-





exp {ζεT [ψK(−isˆ0)− ysˆ0 − 1]} . (3.2.37)
Under H0, cluster size are Pareto random variables with tail index α0. The saddlepoint sˆ0 in
(3.2.37) can be computed from the saddlepoint equation (3.2.31) by replacing α by α0. Let Y˜0








)1/2 exp {LT [ψK(−isˆ)− ysˆ− 1]}
exp {ζεT [ψK(−isˆ0)− ysˆ0 − 1]}
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Solving the Neyman-Pearson test L(y) > η yields







× exp {LT [ψK(−isˆ)− 1]}
exp {ζεT [ψK(−isˆ0)− 1]}
y ≤ − ln η˜
(sˆ− sˆ0)
The Neyman-Pearson threshold η must satisfy
P
{
Y¯ ≥ ln η˜
(sˆ0 − sˆ) |H0
}
= ϕ , (3.2.38)
where







× exp {LT [ψK(−isˆ)− 1]}
exp {ζεT [ψK(−isˆ0)− 1]}





by numerical integration of the pdf given by the saddlepoint approximation in (3.2.30). Another
option is to apply the saddlepoint technique directly to approximate F¯Y¯ (y).
As shown in (3.2.38), we are interested in the complementary cdf under H0. Given H0, recall Y =∑U(T )
j=1 Kj = ζεT Y¯ , with characteristic function exp {ζεT [ψK(θ)− 1]}. Let KY (θ) = lnψY (θ) =
ζεT [ψK(θ)− 1]. Using results from [75], the complementary cdf of Y can be approximated as
F¯Y (y) =








3/2 y = E[Y ]
(3.2.39)
where Φ and φ are the cdf and pdf of the standard normal distribution, respectively, and
wˆ = sign(sˆ)
√




sˆ is the saddlepoint that satisfies the equation
K′Y (−isˆ) = iy , ζεT
[






KY (−isˆ) = αζεT (−csˆ)αΓ(−α,−csˆ)− ζεT
K′′Y (−isˆ) = ζεT
[








Note that if y = E[Y ], then K′Y (0) = E[Y ] and the saddle point sˆ = 0 [17]. In that case wˆ = 0
and the first equation in (3.2.39) is undefined. Therefore, the cdf must be approximated using the
second formula.
The main assumption so far was that packet flows arrive at the control router according to
an homogeneous Poisson process. In reality, the intensity function of the Poisson process is not
constant but varies with time. The following section addresses that case.
3.2.5 Inhomogeneous Marked Poisson
Assume the packet flow process is an inhomogeneous Poisson process. This model is a more realistic
representation of the network traffic. As described in the previous section, each flow are marked
with two random variables. Cluster sizes are Pareto distributed and the Bernoulli mark is such
that a legitimate and attack packet flow (and all data packets in the flow) have unknown source
IP address with probability ε and ς, respectively. The thinning property of Poisson processes
applies in the inhomogeneous case as well. Hence, the legitimate and attack process of flows with
unknown source IP addresses, i.e. {U(t), t ≥ 0} and {A(t), t ≥ 0}, have intensity functions εζ(t)
and ςλ(t). Under H1, the two independent inhomogeneous Poisson processes are additive [109].
The corresponding binary hypothesis testing isH0 : Y ∼ Compound Poisson with intensity εζ(t)H1 : Y ∼ Compound Poisson with intensity εζ(t) + ςλ(t) (3.2.40)
Let L(t) = εζ(t)+ςλ(t). Paxson and Floyd [100] emphasize that TCP traffic can be well modeled as
an inhomogeneous Poisson process with a piecewise constant intensity function. Therefore results
from the Section 3.2 apply, assuming that the observation window of size T is chosen adequately.
Otherwise, saddlepoint approximations can be directly applied in the inhomogeneous Poisson case




where N (t) follows a Poisson distribution with intensity Λ(t). From [114], Y has characteristic
function
ψY (θ) = exp
{∫ T
0
[ψK (θ)− 1]L(υ) dυ
}
(3.2.41)
= exp {Λ(T ) [ψK (θ)− 1]} ,






So far, we have addressed the case where cluster sizes were distributed according to a pure Pareto
distribution. However, Section 2.1 emphasizes that mixture distributions are more adequate models
for cluster size. Therefore the next section applies the saddlepoint approximation method to mixture
distributions. Provided that the variance of the mixture random variable is finite, the first order
saddlepoint can approximate the pdf fK of cluster size K.
3.3 Marked Poisson with Mixture Cluster Size
Consider that cluster sizes {Kj} are mixture random variables. The distribution function of a finite










where the weights qi satisfy 0 ≤ qi ≤ 1 and
∑m
i=1 qi = 1.
We present the saddlepoint approximation for two particular cases: the mixture Pareto/Pareto and
mixture discrete /Pareto distributions. More complex mixtures such as discrete/Pareto/Pareto (see
distribution in (2.1.3)) can be approximated similarly. Saddlepoint approximations for the mixture
distribution basically involve the same steps as with single component distributions. Alternatively,
the FFT method can also be applied to approximate the mixture distribution function.
3.3.1 Mixture Pareto-Pareto
Assume the distribution of cluster sizes {Kj} is composed of two Pareto distributions with param-
eters (α1, c1) and (α2, c2), respectively. That is,













Then the characteristic function of Kj , for any flow j, can be written as
ψK(θ) = (1− q)α1(−i c1 θ)α1Γ(−α1,−ic1 θ) + qα2(−i c2 θ)α2Γ(−α2,−ic2 θ), (3.3.3)
with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1.
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Define the average number of data packets with unknown source IP addresses as Y¯ = 1LT
∑N (T )
j=1 Kj .
We focus on computing the distribution of Y¯ given H1, the procedure for H0 is similar. Proposition
3 shows how to compute the pdf of Y¯ with Pareto cluster sizes if at least the second moment ex-
ists. Approximating fY¯ with mixture cluster size follows (3.2.30) using (3.3.3) as the characteristic
function. The saddlepoint sˆ must satisfy













The saddlepoint sˆ is numerically computed using a rootfinder. Saddlepoint approximations also
require the second derivative of the cgf as
ψ′′K(−isˆ) = (1− q)
[
















Tail probabilities, i.e. F¯Y¯ the complementary cdf of the compound Pareto random variable, can be
approximated by the Luganni-Rice formula [75] as described in (3.2.39). The saddlepoint approxi-
mation may not be always applicable. In that case, the FFT algorithm can be used to approximate
fY¯ (y) based on the mixture characteristic function given in (3.3.3).





evaluated for y large, then the saddlepoint approximation can be applied to the Pareto component
with the smallest tail index if the latter is greater than 2. Otherwise, the pdf fY¯ (y) can be
approximated by a stable distribution if 0 < α < 2 with the minimum tail index. In fact, the
asymptotic tail of the sum of two independent power laws is dominated by the component with the
heaviest tail, i.e., the power law with the smallest tail index [78, 40]. Proposition gives the small θ
expansion of the characteristic function of a mixture of two Pareto distributions.






µK = (1− q) α1c1
α1 − 1 + q
α2c2
α2 − 1 . (3.3.4)
As LT → ∞, i.e. θ → 0, the characteristic function of the normalized number of unknown source
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IP addresses, Y =
∑
Kj, satisfies
ψYˆ (θ) ≈ (1− q)α1(−ic1θ)α1Γ (−α1) + qα2(−ic2θ)α2Γ (−α2) (3.3.5)
Let αm = min{α1, α2}, then
ψYˆ (θ) ≈ αm(−icθ)αmΓ (−αm) (3.3.6)
Proof. Using the property of characteristic functions, i.e. ψaX+b(θ) = e














ψK(θ) = (1− q)α1(−i c1 θ)α1Γ(−α1,−ic1 θ) + qα2(−i c2 θ)α2Γ(−α2,−ic2 θ). (3.3.8)



































+ . . .
)]
Theorem 5 indicates that the effect of the Poisson is negligible. Thus, for simplicity consider Y¯ =∑LT
j=1 Kˆj . The logarithm function admits the following Taylor expansion as ln(1+x) ≈ x− x
2
2 + . . .,












































































As LT →∞, ψYˆ (θ) ≈ (1− q)α1(−ic1θ)α1 Γ (−α1) + qα2(−ic2θ)α2 Γ (−α2) since all other terms tend
to zero. The result follows by replacing µK by its expression given in (3.3.4). If 0 < α1, α2 < 2,
the characteristic function describes the mixture of two stable distributions (see theorems 6 and 7),
which have asymptotic power laws. The mixture of power law distributions is dominated by the
power law with the smallest tail index.
3.3.2 Mixture Discrete-Pareto
Consider the following mixture discrete/Pareto distribution
FK(k) = (1− q)
∑
xi≤k







where xi ∈ {1, 2, . . . , bcc − 1} and with 0 ≤ q ≤ 1. The corresponding characteristic function can
be written as
ψK(θ) = (1− q)
bcc−1∑
i=1
eiθxiP {K = xi}+ qα(−i c θ)αΓ(−α,−ic θ), (3.3.9)
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with derivative




iθxiP {K = xi}+ q
[





Saddlepoint approximations applies to discrete random variables. For example, Davison and Kuo-
nen [26] compute the distribution of a bootstrap statistic, using the saddlepoint method. Huang
et al. [56] also applies the technique to compute the pdf of the Bernoulli mixture model. The
saddlepoint equation is




csˆxiP {K = xi}+ q
[





The approximated pdf is given in (3.2.30) where the second derivative becomes




csˆxiP {K = xi}
+ q
[








Note that saddlepoint approximation smoothes over discrete distribution functions. Alterna-
tively, Davison and Mastropietro [27] propose that the discrete component be first removed from
the mgf. The saddlepoint approximation can then be applied to continuous component alone. Once
the approximated continuous cdf is obtained, the discrete component can be reinserted. However,
note that hypothesis testing requires tail probabilities with small limits on error probabilities.
In fact, ϕ and ξ can be as low as 0.05 or 0.01. We are then interested in tail probabilities as
F¯ (y) = 1 − P {Y = y} = ϕ = 0.05, 0.025. Smoothing over the discrete component of the mix-
ture distribution does not affect the tail probabilities [27]. Proposition 6 demonstrates that the
Pareto component dominates the upper tail, suggesting that the discrete distribution has a limited
contribution.






µK = (1− q)
bcc−1∑
i=1
xiP {K = xi}+ q αc
α− 1 . (3.3.10)
As LT → ∞, i.e. θ → 0, the characteristic function of the normalized number of unknown source
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IP addresses, Y =
∑
Kj, satisfies
ψYˆ (θ) ≈ qα(−icθ)αΓ (−α) (3.3.11)
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Proposition 5. Formula (3.3.7) holds with
ψK(θ) = (1− q)
bcc−1∑
i=1
eiθxiP {K = xi}+ qα(−i c θ)αΓ(−α,−ic θ), (3.3.12)
Let pi = P {K = xi}.





































+ . . .
)]
Based on Theorem 5, consider Y¯ =
∑LT
















































































As LT → ∞, ψYˆ (θ) ≈ qα(−icθ)αΓ (−α) since all other terms tend to zero. The result follows by
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replacing µK by its expression given in (3.3.10).
We conclude the the Pareto component dominates in the tails.
In order to deduce quantile values, we have shown how to use different approximation tools to
evaluate the pdf of the random variable of interest. Instead of modeling the entire distribution, the
focus could be on understanding the upper tail behavior of distribution functions. The next section
present some well-known results in large deviation theory for heavy tailed distributions and show
how they can be applied in hypothesis testing.
3.4 Detection and Large Deviations for Heavy-Tailed Distributions
Recall the binary hypothesis testing based on the percentage of unknown source IP addresses can
be formulated as H0 : Y ∼ Compound Poisson with mean (ζε)TH1 : Y ∼ Compound Poisson with mean (ζε+ λς)T . (3.4.1)
Assume the Neyman-Pearson test can be expressed in terms of Y =
∑
Kj , the total number of
unknown source IP addresses. This is usually the case, when the conditional pdfs, given H0 and
H1, have closed forms and the likelihood ratio can be expressed as a invertible function of the
test statistic. For instance, this is the case when we monitor the percentage of distinct source
IP addresses (see Section 3.1.1). Then, the binary hypothesis test compares two Poisson random













η˜ is a valid test when Y is a compound Poisson-Pareto
random variable. Then the NP threshold, η˜, must be chosen such that P {Y > η˜|H0} = ϕ. The
next sections show how to use large deviations results to deduce quantiles and ultimately compute
η˜.
3.4.1 Compound Poisson and Heavy-Tail Distribution
Let Sn =
∑n
i=1Xi, where {Xi} are iid random variables with cdf FX , which has a heavy tail
i.e., F¯X(x) = 1 − FX(x) = x−αL(x). Recall L(x) is a slowly varying function. For the Pareto
distribution with shape and scale parameters, α and c, L(x) = cα, a positive and constant function.
Assume the tail index satisfies the condition α > 1 so that the random variables {Xi} have a
common finite mean µX . Using the subexponentiality property (3.2.1), Nagaev [90] proves that as
n→∞,
P {Sn − E[Sn] > x} ∼ P {max {X1, X2, . . . , Xn} > x} ∼ nF¯ (x) , (3.4.2)
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with E[Sn] = nµX .
Large deviation results for random sums derive from the case where the number of summands
is a fixed number n. Klu¨ppelberg and Mikosch [68] extend the result (3.4.2) to the case where the
number of summand is a random variable. In particular, they address the case where the number
of summands is a Poisson random variable as described above. Let λ(t) to be the intensity function
of N (t), a Poisson process. Recall N (t) is homogeneous if λ(t) = λ for all t, where λ is a positive
constant; else it is inhomogeneous. Let S(t) =
∑N (t)
i=1 Xi, where {Xi} and N (t) are assumed to
be independent as well. {Xi} are iid random variables with the common cdf FX defined above. If
λ(t)→∞ then for every fixed ρ > 0 and x ≥ ρλ(t),
P {S(t)− µ(t) > x} ∼ λ(t)F¯ (x), (3.4.3)
where µ(t) = E[S(t)] = µXλ(t). Equation (3.4.3) holds if {Xi} have a finite mean. The condition
is violated if the Pareto cluster size have a tail index such that 0 < α < 1.
Based on the tail approximation (3.4.3), we deduce the Neyman-Pearson threshold η˜.
Proposition 7. Assume the Neyman-Pearson test for the binary hypothesis test in (3.4.1) can be




η˜ where Y =
∑N (t)














. Moreover, the NP
threshold, η˜, must be chosen such that P {Y > η˜|H0} = ϕ, we deduce that µY = (ζε)TµK , where
µK is the Pareto mean. Then by (3.4.3),

















. Since Y − µY > y then Y > η˜ ≈ y + µY .
Note that in the mixture distribution case, the complementary cdf can be computed as
F¯K(k) = 1− FK(k) = q
∑
xi≤k









In that case the NP threshold can be computed by numerically inverting Expression (3.4.5).
Section 3.2.2 shows that the compound Pareto random variable can be approximated by a stable
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distribution if the tail index satisfies 0 < α < 2. Fofack and Nolan [38] present an extensive study
on large deviations, tail probabilities and moments of stable distributions. More details can also
be found in [70, 92, 110]. In the following section, we propose to compute the Neyman-Pearson
threshold based on large deviation results for stable distributions.
3.4.2 Tail Probability for Stable Distribution
Given α < 2, Le´vy [70] proves that the tails of stable distributions behave asymptotically as a
Pareto law. That is if X ∼ Sα(1, β, 0) then
















The larger the tail index, the slower the convergence [127]. Nolan [92] extends (3.4.6) to stable
random variables X ∼ Sα(γ, β, 0) and shows that
P {X > x} ∼ γαCα(1 + β)x−α , (3.4.8)
where Cα is computed as in (3.4.7). Equation (3.4.8) corresponds exactly to the upper tail of a
Pareto distribution. One major disadvantage of this tail approximation results from not knowing
the point at which the asymptotic is accurate [38]. Although they could not provide a precise
way about the asymptotic point, Fofack and Nolan [38] attempt to compare the tails of stable and
Pareto distribution to understand when (3.4.8) holds.
Using the same approach as in Proposition 7, Proposition 8 computes the NP threshold as a
function of the tail probability in (3.4.6).















if 1 < α < 2
(3.4.9)












where Cα is computed as in (3.4.7) and





Proof. Theorem 6 and Theorem 7 show that the pdf of Y˜ can be approximated by a stable dis-
tribution with parameters γα = Γ(1 − α) cos (piα2 ) ; β = 1; δ = 0. Equation (3.4.10) follows by
setting the tail value equal to ϕ, the desired limit on false alarm probabilities, and inverting the
resulting expression.
The threshold (3.4.10) can be also applied when the cluster size are a mixture random variable.
Propositions 5 and 6 show that the Pareto component with the heaviest tail dominates the upper
tail distribution.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, a fixed sample size detection system was presented. The model is developed based
on the assumption that network traffic follows a marked Poisson process. The statistic of interest is
the percentage of unknown source IP addresses in a given (fixed length) observation window. The
detection problem is formulated as a binary hypothesis problem with the objective of discriminating
between two compound Poisson processes.
The distribution of the compound random variable is approximated either by a stable distribution
or using saddlepoint approximations. The latter technique is remarkably accurate and relatively
easy to implement while previous methods tend to be very involved. Compound Poisson Pareto
random variables can be found in other areas beside network traffic and DDoS detection. Additional
applications include finance and option pricing where stock returns can be modeled with heavy
tailed distributions. Another application is found in insurance where the total insurance claim
amount can be modeled as a compound random variable with heavy tail claim sizes. Therefore,
the tools presented here can apply in these areas as well.
The proposed mechanism is developed to detect stealthy DDoS attacks. For instance, the de-
tection model takes into account the possibility that attack data packets may be modified so that
they seem to originate from known source IP addresses. Moreover, by allowing the arrival of packet
flows to be an inhomogeneous Poisson process, the detection system addresses the case where DDoS
attacks have a dynamic rate.
By allowing observation windows lengths to vary, as opposed to having a predetermined size, the
detection accuracy and delay can be improved. The next chapter presents such detection models




This section models the DDoS detection problem as a sequential hypothesis testing problem. As
opposed to the previous section, the sample size is stochastic. The arrival of packet flows is again
modeled as a marked Poisson process (Tj ,Kj , Bj) where Tj represents the arrival time of the first
data packet in each flow j, the mark Bj denotes whether flow j has a known or unknown source IP
address, and the mark Kj denotes the cluster size of flow j, i.e. the total number of data packets in
the flow. Moreover, the alternative hypothesis is formulated as a composite hypothesis given that
the rate of the attack packet flows is actually unknown,. We then seek a uniformly most powerful
test (UMP), which is a generalization of Neyman-Pearson criterion [103]. UMP tests indicate that
the NP threshold is valid regardless of the value of the parameter of the composite hypothesis.
4.1 Poisson Processes and Uniformly Most Powerful Tests
Assume Y1, Y2, . . ., Yn are iid samples from an homogeneous Poisson process with rate θ. The
binary hypothesis testing to distinguish two Poisson processes can be formulated asH0 : Yi ∼ Poisson intensity θ0H1 : Yi ∼ Poisson intensity θ1, θ1 > θ0. (4.1.1)
H0 is a simple hypothesis while H1 is composite and for any value of θ1, we seek an UMP test. If the
distribution of the composite hypothesis parameter is known, the binary test can be solved using
a Bayesian approach with uniform or non-uniform costs [88]. The objective is then to minimize
the posterior cost. In reality, prior distributions of hypothesis are generally unknown, rendering
Bayesian constraints unpractical [115]. An alternative to Bayesian methods is the UMP test. Unlike
the Bayesian case, UMP tests don’t assume any distribution function for θ1. Note that UMP tests
don’t always exist, especially when the composite hypothesis is two-sided. Next we prove the
existence of an UMP test for our detection problem (4.1.1). Assume the random variables {Yi}
are collected for successive non-overlapping intervals, each of length h. Then {Yi} are iid Poisson






P {Yi = yi|H1}
P {Yi = yi|H0} (4.1.2)
The likelihood test statistic always depends on observations through a sufficient statistic [88]. So
whenever possible, a sufficient statistic should be derived from the likelihood ratio as shown in
Lemma 11 [103]. The derivation requires the following Factorization theorem.
Lemma 10 (Factorization Theorem [37]). S(Y ) is a sufficient statistic for θ if and only if there
exist functions gθ and h such that
P {Yi = yi, i = 1, 2, . . . , n|θ} = gθ (S(yi))h(yi)
Lemma 11. Let θ be the parameter of a Poisson distribution. S(Y ) =
∑n
i=1 Yi is a sufficient
statistic for θ.
Proof.












(4.1.3) factors as h(y1, y2, . . . , yn)g(S(Y ), θ), where
h(y1, y2, . . . , yn) =
1
y1!y2! . . . yn!
and g(S(Y ), θ) = e−nθh (θh)S(Y )
By the Factorization Theorem (see Lemma 10), S(Y ) is a sufficient statistic.
Given a sufficient statistic, the Karlin-Rubin Theorem states conditions for the existence of an
UMP test.
Lemma 12 (Karlin-Rubin Theorem [95]). Let S be a scalar test statistic whose density, under both
hypothesis, is parameterized by a scalar parameter θ. Assume the likelihood ratio statistic P{S|θ1}P{S|θ0} is
a monotone non-decreasing function of S for every pair (θ0, θ1), with θ1 > θ0. For all (θ0, θ1 > θ0),




η maximizes the probability of detection




η is the uniformly most powerful test among all tests
with the same probability of false alarm.
Theorem 8. The likelihood ratio in (4.1.2) is a non-decreasing function of the sufficient statistic
S(Y ) =
∑n






ln η + nh (θ1 − θ0)
ln θ1 − ln θ0 = κ (4.1.3)
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According to the Neyman-Pearson criterion [103], the threshold κ is selected such that
P {S(Y ) > κ|H0} = ϕ (4.1.4)
Proof. Define
Li(y) =
P {Yi = yi|H1}



























which is equivalent to the test with the sufficient statistic in (4.1.3). The Karlin-Rubin Theorem
indicates that the test (4.1.3) is UMP for the binary hypothesis test formulated in (4.1.1).
Theorem 8 demonstrates that the hypothesis test (4.1.3) is valid regardless of the value of the com-
posite hypothesis value, namely θ1. Now, we must determine the necessary thresholds to perform
Neyman-Pearson tests. Unlike the previous chapter which considers fixed sample size hypothesis
test, the next section describes a sequential HT procedure and the corresponding thresholds.
4.2 Overview Sequential Hypothesis Testing
Internet packet flows arrive sequentially and continuously at the control router. In this case,
a sequential HT may be more indicated than fixed-sample testing. Moreover, multiple samples
carry more information than a single one. We can identify two sequential decision problems. The
first is the sequential hypothesis testing. The objective is to distinguish a ”normal” from an
”abnormal” process using as few observations as possible. The second is the sequential change-
point problem, which consists of detecting a point at which an otherwise ”normal” process starts
to become ”abnormal”. Both models are presented in the next sections.
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4.2.1 Wald’s Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT)
This section adopts the results and notations from [103]. Consider Y1, Y2, . . ., Yn, a sequence of iid
observations. {Yi} are distributed as followsH0 : Yi ∼ f0(y)H1 : Yi ∼ f1(y), (4.2.1)








Wald [121] formulates the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) based on the likelihood ratio.
The SPRT requires two thresholds τ0 and τ1. The essential element of SPRT is to set the thresholds
such that desired levels of type I and type II errors are achieved. Define the sequential decision
rule (φ,D). Given a realized observation sequence {yi, i = 1, 2 . . .}, the binary variable φ indicates
when to stop sampling in the following manner. If φn(y1, y2, . . . , yn) = 0, then take the (n + 1)
st
sample. Else, stop the sample collection and make a decision.
φn(y1, y2, . . . , yn) =
0 if τ0 < L(y) < τ11 otherwise (4.2.3)
Dn(y1, y2, . . . , yn) constitutes the final decision in that it specifies what decision to make when the
sampling procedure is stopped.
Dn(y1, y2, . . . , yn) =
1 if L(y) ≥ τ10 if L(y) ≤ τ0 (4.2.4)
When Dn(y1, y2, . . . , yn) = 0, an additional sample must be collected to update the likelihood ratio
in (4.2.2). Else if Dn(y1, y2, . . . , yn) = 1, the sampling procedure is stopped, and a decision must
be made. Given a decision rule with thresholds (τ0, τ1), Wald’s sequential decision test [121] can
be summarized as follows. If
L(y)

≤ τ0 declare H0 and stop testing
≥ τ1 declare H1 and stop testing
∈ (τ0, τ1) take an additional sample Yn+1
(4.2.5)
In other words, the observation space is partitioned into three mutually exclusive regions, each
corresponding to a decision of collecting additional samples, raising an alarm to signal an attack,
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or declaring that the sample is legitimate. The boundaries, τ0 and τ1 in (4.2.5), must satisfy
0 < τ0 ≤ 1 ≤ τ1 <∞. The decision is arbitrary if τ0 = τ1 [103].
Define the random stopping time as T = min{n|φn(y1, y2, . . . , yn) = 1}. Given {T ≤ t}, T
depends only on Yt but not on Yt+1, Yt+2, . . .. Therefore, T is a Markov stopping time with respect
to the sequence of iid random variables {Yi} [115]. Wald [121] proves that the sequential likelihood
ratio test eventually terminates with probability one. Sequential HT implies that the sample size,
i.e. the stopping time T , is stochastic. The desired performance is fixed and the number of samples
varies accordingly. Let PM and PFA be the probabilities of miss and false alarm (FA), respectively.
Given any decision rule, they are defined as
PFA(φ,D) = P {Dτ (y1, y2, . . . , yτ ) = 1|H0} (4.2.6)
PM (φ,D) = P {Dτ (y1, y2, . . . , yτ ) = 0|H1}
A decision rule with thresholds (τ0, τ1) generates the following error probabilities
ϕ = P {L(y) ≥ τ1|H0}
ξ = P {L(y) ≤ τ0|H1}
The performance of a sequential test is measured in terms of the rate of false alarms and false
clears. A decision can be reached with few samples or additional samples may be required to make
an educated decision. The duration of the sequential test depends on the signal-to-noise ratio.
Another quantity of interest in the sequential hypothesis testing is the expected stopping time,
that is the expected number of samples that must be collected before a decision can be made.
Wald’s sequential probability ratio test minimizes the expected number of collected samples given
that probability errors do not exceed pre-determined bounds. For the same performance, the Wald-
Wolfowitz Theorem, stated below, states the optimality properties of the sequential probability ratio
test.
Theorem 9 (Wald-Wolfowitz Theorem [103]). Let (φ0,D0) be the sequential likelihood ratio test
described in (4.2.5), namely SQRT(τ0,τ1). Consider any other sequential decision rule (φ,D) such
that
PFA(φ,D) ≤ PFA(φ0,D0)
PM (φ,D) ≤ PM (φ0,D0).
Then
E [T (φ)|Hk] ≥ E [T (φ0)|Hk] , (4.2.7)
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with k = 0, 1.
The Wald-Wolfowitz Theorem states that for given PFA and PM , SQRT(τ0,τ1) is the detector with
the smallest average sample size. Sequential test allows us to arbitrarily select the error probabilities
PF and PM , which a great advantage. The question is how to determine the boundaries τ0 and τ1.
Let ϕ and ξ be the desired limits on type I and type II error probabilities, respectively. Wald
[121] proves that the following inequalities hold
τ1 ≤ (1− ξ)
ϕ
and τ0 ≥ ξ
(1− ϕ) , (4.2.8)
Equation (4.2.8) also holds for the case of non-iid random variables [121]. In the non-iid case
however, the likelihood ratio is no longer the product of ratio of pdfs. Note that as the error
probabilities ϕ and ξ decrease, τ0 gets smaller while τ1 gets larger. This implies that the smaller
the bounds on the error probabilities, the more samples are required to make a decision [103].
Using (4.2.8), the boundaries τ0 and τ1 can be approximated to obtain the desired errors ϕ and ξ.
Assume the excess over boundaries defined as [121]
L(y)− τ1 and τ0 − L(y), (4.2.9)






(1− ϕ) , (4.2.10)
Equalities (4.2.10) are known as Wald’s approximations. If ϕ∗ and ξ∗ are the fixed desired error






(1− ϕ∗) . (4.2.11)
Using Wald’s approximations instead of the true decision boundaries increases the expected number
of samples that need to be collected before a decision is reached. Observe that the boundaries do
not depend on the distribution of the {Yi}, which is an advantage of sequential over fixed sample
size hypothesis testing [103]. Furthermore, the boundaries can be easily modified if instead of
the likelihood ratio in (4.2.2), one chooses to use the log-likelihood ratio. The equivalent decision
boundaries are ln τ0 and ln τ1. Note however that the expected sample size (i.e., expected stopping
time), which is a performance indicator, depends on the distribution of observations. Wald’s
Fundamental Identity can be applied to extend these results to general sequential hypothesis testing
problems with random variable of the form g(Yi), where g : R→ R.
Theorem 10 (Wald’s Fundamental Identity [121]). Consider the decision rule (φ,D).




Define Mk(θ) = E [exp {θg(Yi)} |Hk] as the moment generating function of the random variable






for θ ∈ R such that M(θ) <∞.
Corollary 1. Suppose Mk(θ) < ∞ near θ = 0. Let Sn =
∑n
i=1 g(Yi), with g : R → R. Define
µk = E [g((Yi)|Hk] and σ2k = Var [g((Yi)|Hk], for k = 0, 1. Then
E [ST |Hk] = µkE [T |Hk]
E
[
(ST − T µk)2 |Hk
]
= σ2kE [T |Hk] ,
where T is the stopping time.
Later, we apply Wald’s Fundamental Identity to extend Wald’s approximations to sequential test
with statistic of the form Sn =
∑n
i=1 g(Yi), g : R→ R. Corollary 1 allows computing the expected
sample size for the test with statistic Sn. In applying the sequential hypothesis test in our DDoS
detection problem, we must emphasize that one SPRT is not enough. In fact, network traffic must
be monitored continuously, therefore, successive applications of Wald’s tests are necessary [135]. In
other words, when the test ends on the lower boundary, i.e, L(y) ≤ τ0 and H0 is accepted, current
samples can be discarded and a new sequential test started. Of course, when the test ends on
the upper boundary, i.e. L(y) ≥ τ1, the testing procedure is stopped and an alarm is triggered.
Sequential change-point detectors are developed based on this idea of continuous monitoring. The
next section presents two change-point detection procedures.
4.2.2 Change-Point Detection
The change-point detection is similar to applying a sequence of Wald’s sequential tests. Again
consider {Yi, i ≥ 1}, a sequence of iid observations. Let f0(y1, y2, . . . , yn) be the joint pdf of the
observed random variables until an event occurs. In our case, an event would be the start of the
DDoS attack. After the change, which happens at an unknown point in time T , the distribution
becomes f1(y1, y2, . . . , yn). A binary hypothesis test can be formulated based on the stopping time
T , i.e., H0 : change at 0 ≤ T < nH1 : no change for T ≥ n (4.2.13)













A sequential change-point detection procedure consists of identifying the optimal stopping time T ,
i.e. the time at which an alarm is triggered to indicate a change in distribution (f0(y) to f1(y)).
The performance of a change point detector is measured in terms of the rate of false alarms and the
detection delay. The latter corresponds to the expected number of samples that must be collected
before the likelihood ratio exceeds a preset threshold.
Page’s CUSUM [98] algorithm corresponds to applying a sequence of Wald sequential tests with








The stopping time T is defined as





Since observations {Yi, i ≥ 1} are iid, the test statistic Un can be computed recursively as
Un =
0 if n = 0max{0,Un−1 + log f1(Yn)f0(Yn)} if n ≥ 1
Basically, the procedure compares the maximum log-likelihood ratio to a threshold. Samples are
continuously collected to update the likelihood ratio until reaching a decision in favor of H1 , i.e.
Un ≥ ln τ1. Then the testing procedure is stopped and an alarm is triggered. The objective is to
minimize the worst average detection delay. Let T ∗ denote the time required for a single SPRT to
stop. Then
E [T |H0] = 1
ϕ
E [T ∗|H0]
E [T |H1] = 1
1− ξE [T
∗|H1] ,
where ϕ and ξ represent the type I and type II error probabilities, respectively.
An alternative change-point procedure is due to Shiryaev, Roberts and Pollack [116]. Let Rn,T












Assuming that observations are iid, Rn satisfies the recursion
Rn+1 = (Rn + 1) f1(Yn+1)
f0(Yn+1)
The stopping time T must satisfy
T = min {n ≥ 1|Rn ≥ Υ} (4.2.17)
Both change-point detection algorithms seek to minimize the average detection delay for a fixed
average time between false alarms TFA. The threshold Υ can be set as Υ = lnTFA.
One difference between Wald’s sequential likelihood ratio test and sequential change-point is
that the levels of false alarm and detection rates are prefixed and the decision boundaries must be
selected accordingly. Whereas, with the latter, the rate of false alarm is a performance quantity
to be minimized along with the detection delay. Another difference is the number of thresholds.
Wald’s sequential test uses a lower and upper threshols while the change-point algorithms utilizes
only an upper bound, taking an action only when the test statistic exceeds the upper threshold.
Sequential HT requires that the distribution function be known under both hypothesis, which may
be a disadvantage. The next sections demonstrate the application of sequential HT in different
instances of our DDoS detection problem. First, we briefly address the sampling procedure.
4.2.3 Sampling Procedure
As in the precedent chapter, we assume that the process of packet flows is a marked Poisson
process. When {Yi, i ≥ 1}, the sequence of observations is distributed according to a Poisson
process, we can identify two sampling techniques. The first is the time-discrete sampling. Kazakos
and Papantoni-Kazakos [65] propose a time-discrete sequential HT where observations are collected
for each successive non-overlapping time intervals of length h. The second sampling can be viewed
as the ”standard” sequential HT where samples are collected individually, not by time intervals.
Application to our DDoS detection problem shows that one observation with the time-discrete
sampling corresponds to a set of flows (more than one flow) that arrive in the interval h. One the
contrary, the standard sampling implies that we collect one flow after another. The latter method is
particularly useful when dealing with the cluster size of each flow. Computations can be simplified
if we consider that packet flows are independent and collect one flow at the time. Both methods
are illustrated in subsequent sections.
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4.3 Detection Model Based on Distinct Source IP Addresses
Let {U(t), t ≥ 0} and {A(t), t ≥ 0} be the observed process of legitimate and attack packet flows.
Assume both processes are homogeneous Poisson processes. This section discusses a simpler version
of the detection problem where we monitor the percentage of distinct number of unknown source
IP addresses. As mentioned in the previous chapter, all data packets in a flow share the same
source IP address, therefore the flow cluster size is irrelevant for this detection model. The marked
Poisson process described in Section 2.1 simplifies to (Tj , Bj) where the mark Bj is a Bernoulli
random variable and Tj represents the arrival time of the first data packet in each flow. Recall the
Bernoulli mark Bj indicates the probability of that the packet flow j has an unknown source IP
address. Bj has parameter ε for legitimate and % for attack traffic, respectively. Since we don’t
consider cluster size the time-discrete sampling is the most adequate sampling method.
Consider that an observation time interval of length T is partitioned into n intervals Ii = [(i −
1)h, ih], i = 1, 2, . . . , n. The percentage of unknown source IP addresses is computed for each
interval of length h. Let Y1, Y2, . . . , Yn be the number of observed data packet with unknown IP
address in Ii. From the previous chapter, we concluded that under H1, the independent legitimate
and attack Poisson processes were additive. Applying the thinning property of Poisson processes
using the Bernoulli mark separated the initial packet flow process into two independent Poisson
processes: one with unknown and the other with known source IP addresses; we focus on the
former. Let L = ζε+λ%. The binary hypothesis testing to detect whether a DDoS attack is taking
place or not can be formulated as follows.H0 : Yi ∼ Poisson intensity ζεhH1 : Yi ∼ Poisson intensityLh, L > ζε (4.3.1)
H0 is modeled as a simple hypothesis and represents the hypothesis that only legitimate packet
flows are observed. H1, on the other hand, denotes the hypothesis that an attack is taking place in
addition to the legitimate traffic. H1 is formulated as a composite hypothesis since the rate of the
attack flow is unknown. Observations Yi’s are iid Poisson random variables with parameter Lh and
ζεh, under H1 and H0, respectively. The objective of the detection model is to provide an UMP
test for (4.3.1) and apply a sequential detection procedure to distinguish the two Poisson processes.
4.3.1 UMP Test and Pdf Sufficient Statistic
For any value of L > ζε, we can apply Theorem 8 to prove that a uniformly most powerful (UMP)
test exists for (4.3.1). The log-likelihood ratio of the binary hypothesis test defined in (4.3.1) can
be written as







where S(Y ) =
∑n
i=1 Yi. Lemma 11 shows that S(Y ) is a sufficient statistic for the Poisson parameter
hζε or Lh. We can apply Theorem 8 to prove that an UMP test exists for the binary test above.
The proof basically reduces to proving that the value of the threshold κ in (4.1.3) depends solely
on the distribution function of S(Y ) and on the type I error probability ϕ The Neyman-Pearson





ln η + nh (L− ζε)
lnL− ln ζε = κ (4.3.3)
The threshold κ effectively depends on F¯S|H0(y) and on the value of ϕ.
Therefore, (4.3.3) is an UMP test for the binary hypothesis test formulated in (4.3.1). Next, we
briefly address the steps to compute the probability density of the sufficient statistic S(Y ) under
H0 (see (4.1.4)).
Given that Yi’s are iid Poisson with rate hζε under H0, S(Y ) is also Poisson distributed with
rate nhζε [109]. This follows since








In the equation above, ψS(θ) represents the characteristic function of the sufficient statistic. There-
fore, we deduce that the value of the threshold κ in (4.1.3) depends only on the fixed error probability




is the cdf of S(Y ) and Γ(a, z) is the incomplete gamma function. FS(κ) can not be easily inverted
so an approximation must be found. The central limit theorem (CLT) indicates that for a large n,





































Suppose that S(Y ) is continuously sufficient. In other words, the Factorization Theorem 10
and subsequently Neyman-Pearson test (see Theorem 8) applies at every step of the sequential test
[44]. Then Wald’s sequential test, described in (4.2.5), can be reformulated in terms of the sufficient
statistic as H0 if S(Y ) ≤ κ0H1 if S(Y ) ≥ κ1 (4.3.6)
Else, if κ0 < S(Y ) < κ1, update S(Y ) with sample Yn+1. Denote S(κ0, κ1), the sequential hypothe-
sis test with decision boundaries κ0 and κ1, with κ0 < κ1. Ferguson [37] emphasizes that the use of
sufficient statistics reduces the complexity of the hypothesis testing problem. Furthermore, Wald
[121] argues that the SPRT as defined in (4.2.5) satisfies the requirements for composite hypothesis
testing with one-sided alternative hypothesis. The following section shows how to compute the
bounds κ0 and κ1.
4.3.2 Decision Boundaries SPRT
At the stopping time of any sequential hypothesis test, the likelihood ratio L(y) crosses the decision
boundaries in three possible scenarios: no excess, excess over one decision boundary, and finally,
excess over both decision boundaries. With time continuous random processes, as the Poisson
process in our case, the second or first scenario is the most likely [44]. We first address the case of
no excess over boundaries in Proposition 9.
Proposition 9. Assume the excess over boundaries (4.2.9) are negligible. The decision boundaries
in the test (4.3.6) can be defined in terms of Wald’s approximations in (4.2.10).
κ0 =
ln τ∗0
lnL− ln ζε + rh, and κ1 =
ln τ∗1





Proof. Recall Wald’s approximations are
τ∗0 =
ξ







Equation (4.3.7) follows since
L(y) ≥ τ1 ≡ lnL(y) ≥ ln τ∗1






≡ S(Y ) ≥ ln τ
∗
1 + nh (L− ζε)
lnL− ln ζε = κ1
Deriving κ0 is similar.
Taking into account excess over boundaries yields more accurate decision boundaries. These can
be determined from the distribution of the log-likelihood ratio statistic [65, 103]. Define the test
statistic Sn = lnL(y) =
∑n
i=1 Zi. Based on the log-likelihood ratio defined in (4.3.2), the random
variables {Zi} are iid and computed as
Zi = Yi ln
L
ζε
+ h (L− ζε) (4.3.8)
Evaluating decision boundaries requires the Operating Characteristic (OC) function while evalu-
ating the expected stopping time depends on the Average Sample Number (ASN) function. These
functions depend on the distribution of observations and are defined next; also, see [44, 121] for
more details. Let θ be the parameter of the distribution function in the hypothesis testing problem.
In our detection problem, θ would be the rate of the Poisson process, in particular the rate of packet
flows with unknown source IP addresses.
Definition 11. The OC function Q(θ) is the probability that the test stops and the final decision
is H0. More specifically,
Q(θ) = P {Sn ≤ κ0|θ} (4.3.9)
Recall ζε and L are the average numbers of distinct unknown source IP addresses under H0 and
H1, respectively. Moreover, ϕ and ξ are the desired levels of type I and type II error probabilities.
Then, solving Q(θ = ζε) = 1−ϕ and Q(θ = L) = ξ yields the upper and lower decision boundaries,
i.e.κ0 and κ1 [44, 121].
Definition 12. The expected number of samples E [n; θ] function is
E [n; θ] =
n∑
n=1





P {Sn ≤ κ0|θ}+ P {Sn ≥ κ1|θ} if n = 1
P {κ0 < S1 < κ1, . . . , κ0 < Sn−1 < κ1, Sn ≤ κ0|θ}+ P {Sn ≥ κ1|θ}
+P {κ0 < S1 < κ1, . . . , κ0 < Sn−1 < κ1, Sn ≥ κ1|θ}+ P {Sn ≥ κ1|θ} if n > 1
For iid {Zi}, Corollary 1 implies that E [n; θ] can be written as
E [n; θ] =
Q(θ)E [Sn|Sn ≤ ln τ0; θ] + (1−Q(θ))E [Sn|Sn ≥ ln τ1; θ]
E [Zi|θ] , (4.3.11)
If E [Si|θ] = 0, then
E [n; θ] =





If T is the stopping time then the final decision depends on the test statistic ST =
∑T
i=1 Zi.
Given that both T and Zi are random variables, Corollary 1 indicates that E [ST ] = E [T ]E [Zi].
Using Wald’s approximations τ∗0 and τ∗1 and (4.3.11), the expected values of T , under the null and
alternative hypothesis, respectively are
E [T |H0] = ϕ ln τ
∗
1 + (1− ϕ) ln τ∗0
E [Zi|H0] (4.3.13)
E [T |H1] = (1− ξ) ln τ
∗




(4.3.13) assumes no excess over boundaries.
Excess Over One Boundary
Assume the excess scenario two occurs, in particular τ0−L(y) ≈ 0 and L(y)−τ0 > 0 (see (4.2.9)).
Recall S(κ0, κ1) denotes a sequential hypothesis test with decision boundaries κ0 and κ1. Since
τ0 − L(y) ≈ 0, the lower decision boundary κ0 consequently remains unchanged and is computed
as in (4.3.7). We address the case of computing κ1, the upper decision boundary.
Assume the error probabilities limits satisfy ϕ+ξ < 1. Condition ϕ+ξ < 1 is easily met since the

































≤ τ∗1 ≤ ln
1−Q∗(L)
1−Q∗(ζε) , (4.3.15)
where τ∗1 is given by (4.2.10). However, solving Q(θ = ζε) = 1 − ϕ and Q(θ = L) = ξ for the
exact decision boundary κ1 is tedious. Kazakos and Papantoni-Kazakos [65] propose alternative
approximations as shown in Proposition 10.
















h(p) = p(ϕξ + 1− ξ) + 1− ξ − ϕ− [p(ϕξ + 1− ξ) + 1− ξ − ϕ]2 + (4pϕ2ξ)1/2.
4.4 Time-Discrete Sequential Test for Homogeneous Poisson with Cluster
Size
As opposed to the previous section, we now consider the full marked Poisson process (Tj ,Kj , Bj)
and monitor the total number of data packets with unknown source IP addresses, regardless of
duplicates. Recall Kj is the flow cluster size, i.e., it represents the total number of data packets in
flow j. Kj has the mixture distribution described in Section 2.1. Observations are collected based
on the time-discrete sampling method, i.e., for every successive, non overlapping time intervals of
length h. By definition, {Yi =
∑
Kj} are iid compound Poisson random variables and the binary
hypothesis testing becomes:H0 : Yi ∼ Compound Poisson intensity ζεH1 : Yi ∼ Compound Poisson intensityL, L > ζε (4.4.1)
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Note that the distribution of cluster size Kj has different parameters under both hypothesis. The




P {Yi = yi|H1}
P {Yi = yi|H0} (4.4.2)
Compound random variables do not have a closed-form pdf so that we can deduce an optimal
sufficient statistic from (4.4.2). In the sequential test, the likelihood ratio should then be replaced
by an appropriate test statistic. The test statistic must be continuously sufficient so that a decision
can be made at any time [44]. We assume that all sufficient statistics are functions of the observation
data i.e. S(Y ) =
∑n
i=1 g(Yi), where g : R → R. This is justifiable since all observations {Yi} are
iid and carry the same weight, therefore they should be treated equally. The test statistic simply
accumulates the scores from observations. In this section, we choose g to be the identity function,
the square function Y 2i or the log log Yi function are other potential test statistics. We develop the
SPRT by computing and comparing S(Y ) =
∑n
i=1 Yi to predetermined thresholds. Using Theorem
8, Wald’s sequential test described in (4.2.5) can be reformulated in terms of the sufficient statistic
as H0 if S(Y ) ≤ κ˜0H1 if S(Y ) ≥ κ˜1 (4.4.3)
Else, if κ˜0 < S(Y ) < κ˜1, update S(Y ) with the new sample Yn+1.
The following section considers that {Kj} are pure Pareto random variables and designs a sequen-
tial test using S(Y ) as the test statistic, with new decision boundaries. The mixture distribution
case is addressed later.
4.4.1 Pareto Cluster Size










where N (h) is Poisson random variable in the time interval h. Mikosch [80] proves that S(Y ) is
also a compound Poisson random variable. Assume cluster size are distributed according to a pure
Pareto distribution with tail index αk and scale parameter ck, for k = 0, 1 denoting the hypothesis
H0 or H1. Computing the thresholds in (4.3.6) solely depend on the distribution function of the test
statistic S(Y ) and the desired level of type I error probability. The proposed test is thus uniformly
most powerful among all tests using the same statistic and the same limits on error probabilities.
The asymptotic distribution of the test statistic S(Y ) is given next.
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Pdf Test Statistic
Yi is a sum of N (h) iid Pareto random variables. Given H0, N (h) is a Poisson random variable
with mean hζε. Theorem 11 extends results from the previous chapter to show that if 0 < α < 2,
the Pareto distribution has infinite variance and the limiting distribution of S(Y ) as n → ∞ is a
stable distribution with the same tail index. When the tail index is greater than 2, fS, the pdf
of S(Y ), is asymptotically normal and can be approximated using the saddlepoint technique (see
Section 3.2.3).
Theorem 11. Define S˜(Y ) as the normalized test statistic. If 0 < α < 2 and nhζε→∞ then









with characteristic function [108, 110]






















where a = −cααΓ(−α) cos(αpi/2) and b = cααΓ(−α) sin(αpi/2)
Proof. The case of 0 < α < 1 and 1 < α < 2 must be treated separately since the normalization
is different, the reason being that a mean exists in the latter case, while it is infinite in the former





where Kj is a Pareto random variable, Kj ∼ Par(α, 1), 0 < α < 1. The corresponding normalized




j=1 K˜ij . Note that S˜(Y ) has a one-to-one correspondence
with S(Y ) and subsequently is a sufficient statistic. Recall from Lemma 4, K˜j is also Pareto





















































→ 0 and the rest of the proof follows as in Theorem 6.
Now assume Kj is purely Pareto distributed with tail index 1 < α < 2. The proof can be found
in [108]. Define n˜ = n∗E[N (h)] = n∗ζεh and approximate S(Y ) as the sum of n˜ iid Pareto random
variables. Note that if we choose the observation window length h such that h < 1/ζε, then at
most N (h) = 1 and n˜ ∼ n. Therefore, the sufficient statistic is approximated as S(Y ) = ∑n˜j=1Kj .










Recall for any i, the mean of the Pareto distribution with 1 < α < 2 is







1 {k ≥ c > 0}







dθ = α( c θ)αΓ(−α, c θ) , <(θ) > 0 (4.4.9)
Given the expansion of the incomplete gamma function,








φK(θ) can be written as











= 1 + α(c θ)αΓ(−α)− α
α− 1(c θ) +
α
2(α− 2)(c θ)
2 + . . .










eiθkfKi(k)dk = φKi(−iθ) ,
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Around zero, the natural logarithm admits the Taylor expansion ln(1 + x) ' x− x22 + x
3
3 − . . ..
Thus, for n˜ large,
ψS˜(Y )(θ) = limn→∞ exp
{
−i θ µ n˜1−1/α + α i c θ
α− 1 n˜
1−1/α + αΓ(−α) (−i c θ)α + . . .
}
Recall the definition of the mean µ, then for n˜ large,
























Comparing ψS˜(Y )(θ) to the general characteristic function of a stable random variable, which for
1 < α < 2 is, exp
{
iδθ − a|θ|α [1 + iβ sign(θ) tan (piα2 )]}, we identify δ = 0, β = −1, and a =
−cααΓ(−α) cos(αpi/2). The inverse Fourier transform of ψS˜(Y )(θ) gives (4.4.7).
For given levels of decision boundaries, the next paragraph outlines the procedure to approximate
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the type I and type II error probabilities, i.e. ϕ and ξ.
Approximated Error Probabilities
The sequential test is not defined in terms of likelihood ratio, hence we must approximate new
decision boundaries using the test statistic S(Y ) =
∑n
i=1 Yi. Poor [103] explains the procedure,
which requires that the moment generating function of the test statistic g(Yi) satisfiesMk(tˆk) = 1
for k = 0, 1 denoting the hypothesis H0 or H1. Additional assumptions include P {g(Yi) < 0} > 0
and P {g(Yi) > 0} > 0, for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Setting g to be the identity function violates the
assumptions P {g(Yi) < 0} > 0 since the random variables {Yi} are positive by definition. This
issue can be resolved by simply adjusting g and subtracting the mean of Yi. Tartakovsky et al.
[116] propose a similar adjustment for the non-parametric sequential change-point problem. Let
the adjusted test statistic be
g(Yi) = Yi − µ0i − µˆ1i , (4.4.12)
where µ0 is the common and known mean of Yi under H0 and is computed as
µ0 = E [Yi|H0] = ζεt αc
α− 1 (4.4.13)
The last equality follows from Wald’s Identity (see Corollary 1). The parameter µˆ1n−1 is the sample
mean under H1 estimated from the n− 1 previous observations. The parameter  ∈ (0, 1) must be
determined based on historical data. The decision boundaries can now be estimated as shown in
Proposition 11.
Proposition 11. Let k = 0, 1 denote the hypothesis H0 or H1.


















where tˆ0 and tˆ1 are solutions to
−tˆk(µ0i + µˆ1i ) + λk
[
αk(−ck tˆk)Γ(−αk,−ck tˆk)− 1
]
= 0. (4.4.15)
The expected samples sizes given H0 and H1 respectively are
E [T |H0] = −ϕ ln κ˜1 + (1− ϕ) ln κ˜0
µˆ1i
(4.4.16)
E [T |H1] = (1− ξ) ln κ˜1 + ξ ln κ˜0−µ0i − µˆ1i + E [Yi|H1]
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Proof. Let λk denote the rate of the compound Poisson process, given hypothesis Hk, k = 0, 1. The






{−t(µ0i + µˆ1i )} exp {λk [αk(−ckt)Γ(−αk,−ckt)− 1]}
Derive tˆk by numerically solving the following equation
Mk(tˆk) = 1 ≡ −tˆk(µ0i + µˆ1i ) + λk
[
αk(−ck tˆk)Γ(−αk,−ck tˆk)− 1
]
= 0






Ignoring the excess over boundaries implies that
S(Y ) =
κ˜0 with probability 1− ϕκ˜1 with probability ϕ
under H0 and similarly under H1
S(Y ) =
κ˜0 with probability ξκ˜1 with probability 1− ξ
From these equations, we deduce that
(1− ϕ)etˆ0κ˜0 + ϕetˆ0κ˜1 ' 1
ξetˆ1κ˜0 + (1− ξ)etˆ1κ˜1 ' 1
which yields (4.4.14) [103].
The expected sample size equations (4.4.16) follow from (4.3.13) with the new decision boundaries
and
E [g(Yi)|H0] = E
[
Yi − µ0i − µˆ1i |H0
]
= −µˆ1i
E [g(Yi)|H1] = E
[
Yi − µ0i − µˆ1i |H1
]
= −µ0i − µˆ1i + E [Yi|H1]
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4.4.2 Mixture Cluster Size
Assume cluster sizes have a mixture distribution as described in (2.1.3). Results from the previous
section apply. The distribution of the test statistic S(Y ) in (4.4.4) can be approximated by a stable
distribution. For large values of the pdf, Propositions 5 and 6 shows that the Pareto component
with the heaviest tail dominates. Therefore Theorem 11 applies. Detection error probabilities can
be estimated with Equation (11). The mean under H0 given by (4.4.13) becomes
µ0 = E [Yi|H0] = ζεt
q bcc−1∑
i=1
xiP {K = xi}+ q1 α1c1




4.5 Sequential HT for Homogeneous Poisson with Cluster Size
Given that each flow i as a cluster of size Ki, we can apply the ”standard” sampling method,
which consists of observing one flow at the time. This contrasts from the previous section with the
time-discrete sampling approach. Assume packet flows are independent.
4.5.1 Pareto Cluster Size
Given one single flow i with unknown source IP address, the total number of data packets with
unknown IP address is equivalent to the flow cluster size Ki. In this section observations are taken
directly to be the flow cluster sizes, Yi = Ki, i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Cluster sizes are assumed to be
Pareto random variables, where the parameters vary according to the tested hypotheses H0 and
H1. This follows since realistically attack packet flows may have a different cluster size distribution
than legitimate packet flows, which modifies the distribution under H1. The binary hypothesis test
corresponding to the DDoS detection problem can be written asH0 : Yi ∼ Par(α0, c0)H1 : Yi ∼ Par(α1, c1) (4.5.1)
Note that observations {Yi} are no longer compound random variables. Therefore, the technique of
sampling one flow at the time simplifies computations because unlike compound random variables,
the Pareto distribution has a closed form pdf. Next, we formulate the sequential HT for solving
the binary test in (4.5.1). Essentially, we present the modified Wald’s boundaries and compute the
average number of collected samples.
Lemma 4 indicates that under H0,
Yi
c0
∼ Par(α0, 1). Similarly, Yic1 ∼ Par(α0, 1), given H1. Given
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+ (α0 − α1) ln yi. (4.5.4)
Lemma 13 shows that the random variable {lnYi} in (4.5.4) are distributed according to an expo-
nential distribution.






Proof. The result follows since














Therefore lnYi ∼ Exp (α0) and lnYi ∼ Exp (α1) given H0 and H1, respectively. Note that
S(Y ) =
∑n
i=1 lnYi is a sufficient statistic for α and
∑n
i=1 lnYi ∼ Gamma (α, n). We now deduce
the upper and lower decision boundaries. Recall ϕ and ξ are the type I and II error probabilities,
respectively.
Proposition 12. Assume the excess over boundaries (4.2.9) are negligible. The sequential ratio
test can be formulated in terms of the sufficient statistic S(Y ) =
∑n
i=1 lnYi as in (4.3.6). The
corresponding decision boundaries are defined in terms of Wald’s approximations in (4.2.10).
κ0 =
ln τ∗0
α1 − α0 + rn, and κ1 =
ln τ∗1













The proof is similar to that of Proposition 9.
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where tˆ0 = 1 and tˆ1 = −1.


















1− (α0 − α1)t
αk
)−1








1− (α0 − α1)tˆk
αk
)
The equation above yields tˆ0 = 1 and tˆ1 = −1.
If we neglect the excess over boundaries then Sn is a discrete random variable which, given H0,
takes the following values
Sn =
ln τ0 with probability 1− ϕln τ1 with probability ϕ
Similarly, under H1,
Sn =
ln τ0 with probability ξln τ1 with probability 1− ξ






Similarly, Wald’s Fundamental Identity can be applied to approximate the expected sample size
of the test (4.5.1), using the random variables zi.
The decision boundaries presented above corresponds to the case of negligible excess over bound-
aries. Assume at the stopping time, the likelihood ratio exceeds one of the decision boundaries.
This case is addressed in the following section.
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Excess Over One Boundary
Exploiting the relationship between Pareto and exponential random variables (see Lemma 13),
the binary hypothesis problem in (4.5.1) reduces to comparing the parameters of two exponential
distributions. It can be reformulated asH0 : Yˆi = ln Yic0 ∼ Expo(α0)H1 : Yˆi = ln Yic1 ∼ Expo(α1) (4.5.9)
Note that hypothesis testing is invariant under the same transformation. In practice, the same
transformation should be applied to observations. On one hand, we can assume the scale parameters
satisfy c0 = c1 = c. Alternatively, c can be set as c = max{c0, c1}.
The case of hypothesis testing with exponential means has been studied earlier. Given preassigned
detection error probabilities ϕ and ξ, Albert [1] determined that the decision boundaries must satisfy
κ0 = ln
ξ











where for 0 ≤ x ≤ s′
Mm(x;α) =
e(1+h
′)xGm (−κ′1 + (m+ 1)s′)−Gm (−κ′1 + (m+ 1)s′ − x)









(t+ κ′1 − js′)j ,
κ′1 =
κ∗1α
α1 − α0 ,
s′ =
α ln(α1/α0)
α1 − α0 .
κ∗1 is Wald’s approximations defined in (4.2.10). Equation (4.5.10) indicates that Wald’s approxi-
mation is accurate when α1/α0 is close to one, that is when the exponential distribution parameters
satisfy α1 ≈ α0.
Computing the parameter m in the threshold function (4.5.10) is a trial and error procedure,
which might be inconvenient. Based on Wald’s Fundamental Identity (see Theorem 10), the OC





























+ (α0 − α1)yi
]
(4.5.12)








+ (α0 − α1)yi. (4.5.13)
Let k = 0, 1 and αk be the parameter of the exponential distribution, given hypothesis Hk. The
mgf of the random variable Zˆi is computed as
MZˆ(t, α) , E
[

















1− (α0 − α1)tˆk
αk
)












with k = 0, 1, tˆ0 = 1 and tˆ1 = −1.
As mentioned earlier, at the stopping time, the likelihood ratio L(y) crosses the decision bound-
aries in three possible scenarios: no excess, excess over one decision boundary, and finally, ex-
cess over both decision boundaries. Assume the second scenario, that is let τ0 − L(y) ≈ 0 and
L(y)− τ1 > 0. Then, under H0 and under H1, the test statistic Sn respectively takes values
Sn =
ln τ0 with probability 1− ϕln τ1 +R with probability ϕ (4.5.17)
Sn =
ln τ0 with probability ξln τ1 +R with probability 1− ξ
Let κ1 = ln τ1, then R = Sn − κ1 denotes the excess over boundary, which is a random variable
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with unknown distribution function. Recall Sn =
∑n
i=1 Zi. Let µZ be the common finite mean of
the random variables {Zi} described in (4.5.13). Then Corollary 1 shows that E [ST ] = µZE [T ].





E[Zi − r|Zi > r] (4.5.18)
Lorden [73] emphasizes that the bound is exact for the exponential distribution, in which case the
supremum is attained when r = 0. Therefore,
E[R|Hk] ≤ E[Zi|Hk] ≤ 1
αk
(α0 − α1) (4.5.19)
In terms of the OC function, ϕ and ξ, the type I and II error probabilities, can be written as
Q(α0) = 1− ϕ and Q(α1) = ξ. Equations (4.5.16) and (4.5.17) imply that

























The excess over boundary random variable is non-negative and is exponentially distributed due to
the memoryless property of the exponential distribution. Therefore,
1 ≤ E [etkR|α] = α
α− tk (4.5.23)
4.5.2 Mixture Cluster Size
If cluster sizes {Kj} are distributed according to a mixture distribution, then the likelihood ratio has
an explicit expression and the SPRT applies with Wald’s approximations representing the decision
boundaries (see (4.2.10)). The binary hypothesis testing is the same as (4.5.1), except the random
variables Yi have a mixture distribution.












































The sequential test is described in (4.2.5) where τ0 =
ξ




In this chapter, sequential detection models were presented. By allowing the sample size to vary,
detection performances can improve. Test statistics were computed from the likelihood ratio or as a
real function of the observations. The alternative hypothesis which suggests a DDoS attack is taking
place, was formulated as a composite hypothesis testing so that UMP tests were required. Note
that the models presented here apply when the packet flows arrive according to an inhomogeneous
Poisson process. The SPRT can be truncated appropriately.
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL DDOS DETECTION MODEL
This chapter departs from the previous ones in that no theoretical model is developed for network
traffic. As we have seen, modeling Internet traffic is very challenging due to the complex and
dynamic nature of the network. Non-parametric detection models can be more indicated then. The
detection model presented here is non-parametric and is developed using empirical real network
traces. Previous models can potentially lead to larger detection errors since they combined both
estimation and detection theory. The non-parametric model then has the advantage of being more
realistic since estimation errors are eliminated.
The empirical detection system monitors two traffic statistics simultaneously to test the hypothe-
sis that only legitimate traffic is observed (H0) against the hypothesis that a DDoS attack is taking
place (H1). In addition to the percentage of unknown source IP addresses, a second statistic, de-
fined as the mean to standard deviation ratio of packet sizes, is introduced. Given that no closed
form pdf exist, the joint likelihood ratio is estimated using a probability grid. Simulations are
conducted using the MIT network traces.
Two models are developed. The first is equivalent to a supervised learning classification. The
observation space, i.e. the probability grid, is partitioned into the rejection and acceptance region
[59], using a Neyman-Pearson criterion. The binary decision between two hypothesis relies on the
likelihood ratio and where it classifies the observed sample in the grid. The second detection model
is a non-parametric sequential change-point model [116, 135].
5.1 Data Packet Sampling Procedure and Traffic Statistics
The following section discusses observation windows, how data packet are sampled and specify how
traffic statistics are computed.
5.1.1 Measuring Traffic Statistics
Two traffic statistics are collected at discrete intervals called observation windows. Each observation
window ∆i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , is measured in terms of number of data packets rather than time
intervals. Data packet sampling is addressed in a subsequent section. As in the previous chapters,
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the first monitored statistic is the percentage of unknown source IP addresses. Assume all attack
data packets have an unknown source IP address. Even though all spoofed source IP addresses are
new to SIL, the identification of attack packets is not straightforward as legitimate data packets
also have unknown source IP addresses. Let Ai be the number of attack data packets and Ui
the total number of legitimate data packets with unknown source IP addresses in an observation
window Deltai, respectively. Assume ∆i contains mi data packets, and define the percentage of





Ni is a discrete random variable defined on the set YN = {0, 1mL , 2mL , . . . ,
mL−1
mL




In addition to differentiating legitimate from attack traffic, Ni can determine whether data packets
are part of a flash crowd or from a flooding DDoS attack. This is possible since most source IP
addresses from a flash crowd appear in SIL [63, 102].
The second network traffic statistic to be monitored is the dispersion of data packet sizes. Au-
thentic Internet users have different needs therefore legitimate traffic presents a large range of packet
sizes. On the other hand, attack data are machined generated and are usually of the same size. For
example, the SYN and ICMP flooding attacks have 40 and1500 byte data packets, respectively [29].
Moreover, Lan et al. [69] studied 90 DDoS, all attacks used 60 byte size packets. Unless, otherwise
specified, assume attack data packets all have the same size. This characteristic can be exploited to
identify potential threats to the target network but once again the identification process is marred
by the incessant arrival of legitimate data packets. In their attempt to discriminate attack from
legitimate data packets, Du and Abe [29] analyze the entropy of the distribution of data packet
sizes. Although packet size entropy can effectively measure the dispersion of a random variable, an
attacker can be clever and bypass this approach. For example, consider an attacker who send data
packets of sizes 40, 41, 42, 43... bytes. The resulting entropy is large, indicating legitimate traffic
conditions while the network is in fact under attack. Instead, we propose to compute the mean to
standard deviation ratio of packet size for each observation window. Let Zk be the size of packet
k, where k ∈ ∆i, k = 1, 2, . . . ,mi. For each observation window ∆i of length mi (i = 1, 2, . . . ,M),































Si can effectively measure the dispersion of packet sizes and also overcomes the limitation of the
entropy approach proposed in [29]. Note that both traffic statistics are normalized such that, for
any i, 0 ≤ Ni, Si ≤ 1. In all subsequent sections, assume the random variables Ni and Si are
independent. However note that successive readings (i.e. Ni−1 and Ni or Si−1 and Si ) can be
correlated over time [6, 126]. The two heterogeneous statistics allow monitoring different aspects
of Internet traffic at once to effectively distinguish legitimate from attack data. Detection results
are more reliable than using only one statistic.
5.1.2 Packet Sampling
Let mi be the size of observation window ∆i. This indicates that traffic statistics are computed for
every batch of mi data packets that arrive at the control router. If mi is small computations are fast
but resulting statistics can be ambiguous. Whereas large mi’s require more calculation and a longer
data collection process [118]. Weak victims particularly don’t survive long delays of computation.
For instance, if the average data packet rate is 10 pps then collecting 100 packets require waiting at
least 10s. However, some DDoS attacks last less than 10s [101, 29]. The necessity arises to define
a lower (mL) and an upper bounds (mU ) on observation window lengths. Consequently, {mi} are
iid random variables with range [mL,mU ], and observation windows can have uneven sizes. One
can think of an alternative option to define observation window lengths as time intervals. However,
due to the dynamic nature of Internet traffic (non-homogeneous arrival process), this option is
inefficient. For example, simulations with the MIT traces show that a one second time interval can
contain anywhere between 0 to 662 data packets. Next, we explain how to set the limits mL and
mU .
Our approach to finding the boundaries consists of sampling data packets until σi > 0, where
σi is the standard deviation defined in (5.1.3). This is similar to applying a Wald’s sequential
analysis with stopping criteria as σi > 0 [121]. Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution of samples
sizes resulting from using the criteria σi > 0, mU =∞ and mL = 0. For clarity, the graph has been
truncated after m > 100.
Figure 5.1 demonstrates that with probability ' 0.45, two consecutive legitimate data packets
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Figure 5.1: Sampling Size (m) Distribution for W1-M
have different sizes. Even though it is a very rare event (probability 1/130425), it can happen that
as many as 1173 consecutive legitimate data packets have the same size. This emphasizes the need
of an upper bound mU on observation window lengths. Additional numerical results are given in
Table 5.1 which expresses for each dataset, the percentage of observations with size less or equal
to 2 , 5, 10, 20, 50 and 60 packets. Observe that about 99% of observation windows have size less
than 50 packets and on average 97.28% of samples have size less than 20. In other words, setting
mU = 50 guarantees that about 99% of observation windows satisfy the condition σi > 0.
Table 5.1: Percentiles Observation Window Size
mi W1-M W1-Tu W1-W W1-Th W1-F
2 43.42 30.93 48.09 37.97 39.76
5 83.1 80.25 84.24 82.25 79.08
10 93.66 93.22 94.67 93.49 92.24
20 97.19 97.27 98.07 96.55 96.73
50 99.33 99.19 99.65 99.31 99.16
60 99.51 99.4 99.76 99.49 99.38
95
Before setting the final sampling parameters, we also measure the impact of varying mU and mL
on traffic statistics. For the W1-M dataset, Figure 5.2 illustrates the probability density of the
statistics N and S, respectively. In both graphs, the red area depicts the probability distribution
when data is sampled with parameters mL = 0 and mU = ∞ while the blue area represents the
sampling case with mL = 20 and mU =∞. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 provide additional numerical results
and show quantiles for both traffic statistics.
Table 5.2: N Distribution Statistics
Statistic mL = 0, mU =∞ mL = 10, mU =∞ mL = 20, mU =∞
Average 0.152 0.149 0.15
Median 0 0 0
25th Percentile 0 0 0
75th Percentile 0 0.1 0.15
95th Percentile 1 0.923 0.9
Table 5.3: S Distribution Statistics
Statistic mL = 0, mU =∞ mL = 10, mU =∞ mL = 20, mU =∞
Average 0.69 0.652 0.635
Median 0.78 0.61 0.561
25th Percentile 0.446 0.429 0.425
75th Percentile 0.871 0.9 0.897
95th Percentile 0.972 0.956 0.9514
In general, quantiles decrease as the lower bound mL increases. The impact is less noticeable
for the percentage of unknown source IP address statistic. Based on these experiments, we set the
maximum observation window size to be mU = 50 so that only large tail values are eliminated.
The lower bound is set to mL = 20 and observation windows lengths are random variables taking
integer values between 20 and 50. Note that the overall average packet rate for the MIT datasets is
approximately 17.98 pps. Therefore, collecting 50 and 20 data packets require an average waiting
time of 2.78s and 1.11s, respectively. We estimate that these are reasonable time intervals. Recall
the training phase uses historical data only, computation delays and consequently mU are irrelevant,
however a lower bound mL is necessary. To calibrate the model as close as possible to real-life
conditions, training and testing both use mL = 20 and mU = 50. Having an upper bound on
observation window sizes also helps identify when there is a surge of data packets with the same size
suggesting an attack is taking place. The phenomenon manifests by several consecutive observation
windows having the same size mU .
The next section present the first detection model, which is formulated as a binary detection
model. Similar to supervised learning, the detection mechanism involves two steps. The training
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Figure 5.2: N-S Probability Distribution
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phase consists of developing and calibrating the detection system using historical data whereas
the testing procedure verifies that the DDoS detection structure functions properly under real
conditions. If necessary, the detection system should be re-calibrated using the feedback from
testing. Training dataset are exclusively composed of legitimate data packets whereas testing
datasets contain a mixture of legitimate and attack data packets.
5.2 Supervised Learning Detection Model
The first steps in the detection process include packet sampling and statistic collection as explained
earlier. Once traffic statistics are collected, the joint empirical likelihood ratio must be evaluated
as part of the training phase. Estimating the joint likelihood ratio requires a 2D probability grid.
The procedure to design the grid is explained next.
5.2.1 Training Phase: Designing the Probability Grid
Each dimension of the probability grid corresponds to a traffic statistic. In other words, the grid
represents the observation space in the binary detection problem. Recall, Ni represents the per-
centage of unknown source IP addresses in observation window ∆i. It is a discrete random variable






, . . . , mU−1mU , 1} whereas Si, the packet size
statistic, is a continuous random variables with sample space YS = [0, 1]. The observation space
therefore is














, . . . ,
mU − 1
mU
, 1} × [0, 1]. (5.2.1)
Without loss of generality, let the horizontal axis represent YN and the vertical axis be YS . To
evaluate the likelihood ratio, we discretize the observations space Y, that is the 2D grid is partitioned
into cells ej ’s (j = 1, 2, . . . , C), where C = C1 × C2. Let C1, C2 ∈ N be the total number of
coordinates on the primary and secondary axis, respectively. Both parameters must be provided by
the user. They controls the granularity of each axis and ultimately the granularity of the grid. Let
Vectors ~U and ~V describe the coordinates of grid cells. Cell coordinates are generated by inverse
transform of FN and FS , the empirical cumulative distribution functions of random variables N
and S. Steps to build the grid can be summarized as follows
1. Sample a dataset containing only legitimate data packets into observation windows ∆i’s using
the lower and upper bounds mL = 20 and mU = 50.
2. Compute the two traffic scoress, Ni and Si for each ∆i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , using (5.1.1) and
(5.1.4).
3. Evaluate the empirical cdfs FN and FS using a cumulative histogram.
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4. Apply an inverse transform method to invert FN and compute the horizontal coordinates of
each grid cell ej .
5. Conditioning on the horizontal coordinates, invert FS to estimate the vertical coordinates of
each grid cell ej .
The last two steps above imply that horizontal cell coordinates correspond to percentiles of the
random variable N while vertical cell coordinates are conditional percentiles of the random variable
S. Next, the inverse transform method is described in more details. First, for all ω (0 ≤ ω ≤ 1),
define the cdf range of the random variable Λ, with Λ = N,S as
RΛ = maxFΛ(ω)−minFΛ(ω). (5.2.2)
Given C1, define the vector ~U = [Ut1 ,Ut2 ,Ut3 , . . . ,UtC1 ] as the primary axis coordinates. For all
ω and j = 1, 2, . . . , C1, tj ’s are computed as
tj =

minFN (ω), j = 1
1, j = C1
tj−1 + RNC1 , 2 ≤ j < C1.
(5.2.3)








minNi, j = 1
maxNi, j = C1
F−1N (tj), 2 ≤ j < C1
(5.2.4)
If Ut1 6= 0, define Ut0 = 0 and insert it as the starting point of vector ~U . Also, if UtC1 6= 1, define
UtC1+1 = 1 and add it as the ending point of ~U . This adjustment is necessary since by definition,
0 ≤ N ≤ 1; it guarantees that observation windows with scores N < Ut1 or N > UtC1 will be
properly assigned to a grid cell. Consequently the number of coordinates on the primary axis may










as the secondary axis coordinates. The same procedure is
applied to compute the secondary coordinates, only this time they are conditioned on the primary





Si | Utj−1 ≤ N < Utj
}
, i = 1
max
{
Si | Utj−1 ≤ N < Utj
}
, i = C2
F−1S | Utj−1≤N<Utj (hi), 2 ≤ i < C2
(5.2.5)
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The variables hi’s are computed as described in (5.2.3), using FS instead of FN . Like ~U , if necessary
the starting and ending points of ~V are modified to be Vt0 = 0 and VtC1+1 = 1, respectively. Axis
coordinates must be unique otherwise zero width column/row intervals will be created. In practice
if Uti = Utj = U for i 6= j then only Uti = U is represented in the ~U .
The estimation procedure results in a grid partitioned into a total of C = C1×C2 non-overlapping
rectangles. Due to the inverse transform method and conditioning, grid cells may have uneven
proportions. Any cell ej is uniquely described by two intervals:
[Utj−1 ,Utj] × [Vjhi−1 ,Vjhi], where
Utj−1 < Utj and Vjhi−1 < V
j
hi
Note that the constant C1 and C2 are not necessarily the same,
therefore the grid is not always square. The larger C1 and C2, the more precise the grid is. Since
the detection model monitors only two statistics, rectangular-shaped cells are appropriate. As the
number of random variables increases, the dimension of the grid increases and more sophisticated
shapes can be used. Although we illustrated the procedure by choosing the horizontal as the
primary axis, either axis, vertical or horizontal, can be designated as primary. The shape of the
resulting grid might change depending on this choice, however, the likelihood ratio estimation is
unaffected.
Once the probability grid is obtained, the next step consists of estimating the joint likelihood ratio
corresponding to each grid cell ej , j = 1, 2, . . . , C. Although the probability grid is built using only
legitimate data packets, estimating the joint likelihood ratio requires both legitimate and attack
data packets. The statistics, as described in Section 5.1.1, may not be enough to discriminate the
two types of data packets. The next section describes the procedure to improve traffic statistics
through the use of a weighting system. Joint likelihood ratios can then be computed using the new
weighted statistic.
5.2.2 Training Phase: Weighted Statistic and Likelihood Ratios Estimation
The weight function applies to the packet size statistic, i.e. Si, and is defined in terms of the number
of attack data packets contained in each observation window. Let τi =
Ai
mi
be the percentage of
attack data packets contained in the observation window ∆i and let T denote the maximum threat
level allowed per observation window. There are two types of observation windows, as defined
below.
Definition 13. An observation window ∆i is a threat if τi > T and a non-threat if τi ≤ T.
Recall in most DDoS flooding attacks, data packets are not malformed (as opposed to logic
DDoS attacks). Depending on the capacities of the target network, ”few” attack data packets
can be processed without crashing the target server. In that case, T can be a positive constant.
Otherwise, T = 0, implying that an observation window is considered as a threat (and should be
removed) if it contains at least one attack data.
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By definition, as τi increases, i.e. τi → 1, the corresponding observation window ∆i should yield
traffic statistics close to one, i.e. Ni, Si → 1. Measurements from non-threat observation windows
must remain close to zero. The traffic statistic formulas given in (5.1.1) and (5.1.4) do not always
reflect that property. To enforce it, we propose to conditionally weight the packet size statistic
S. Assume for now that the percentage of unknown source IP addresses (N) remains identical to
(5.1.1).




Z¯i + κi × σi , (5.2.6)
where Zi is the arithmetic average of packet sizes in ∆i. The weights in (5.2.6) are computed as
follows
κi =
X¯ if Ai = 01
τi
= miAi if Ai > 0,
(5.2.7)
where X¯ is the average of the mean to standard deviation random variable, Xi (see Formula
(5.1.2)). When an observation window ∆i does not contain any attack data packets (Ai = 0),
the weighting function (5.2.7) causes the packet size statistic to decrease and be close to zero, as
desired. Otherwise, Si increases proportionally to the number of attack data packets contained in
∆i. The more attack data packets ∆i contains, the closer S¯i is to one. Note that the training phase
uses only historical data, therefore Ai and subsequently τi can be evaluated exactly. Figure 5.3
illustrates the effect of the weight function for legitimate data packet only. The first graph depict
the distribution of the packet size random variable without any weighting system. All observation
windows yields a packet size statistic greater than 0.2889 despite the fact that they do not contain
any attack data packets. Using the weight κi = 10 causes the distribution to be concentrated
towards zero as shown in the second graph. The third graph illustrates the weighted statistic with
κi = 35, which corresponding to the 95% percentile of the random variable Xi described in (5.1.2).
We conclude that the weighted packet size statistic performs better than (5.1.4) to discriminate
legitimate from attack data packets. Subsequently, the joint likelihood ratios can be estimated
more accurately. The binary hypothesis problem consists of two hypothesis: H0 is the hypothesis
that only legitimate traffic is observed whereas H1 denotes the hypothesis that an attack is taking
place. Define Ri as the aggregated score of each observation window ∆i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M . Assuming
the random variables Ni and Ri are independent, the pdfs satisfy fR(y) = fN (y)× fS(y). For each






Figure 5.3: Weighted Packet Size Statistic
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The procedure to estimate the pdfs fR|H1(y) and fR|H0(y) can be summarized as follows.
1. Sample a dataset containing both legitimate and attack data packets into observation windows
∆i’s with parameters mL = 20 and mU = 50.
2. Compute the two traffic statistics, Ni and Si for each ∆i, i = 1, 2, . . . ,M , using (5.1.1) and
(5.2.6), respectively.
3. Classify each ∆i into the probability grid using Ni and Si as the horizontal and vertical
coordinates, respectively.
4. Estimate the empirical joint pdf fR|H1(y) as the percentage of threat observation windows that
falls into a particular cell ej . Similarly, fR|H0(y) corresponds to the percentage of non-threat
observation windows in ej [59].
5. For each grid cell ej , compute the joint likelihood ratio using Formula (5.2.8).
Note that any observation window ∆i can be classified into one (and only one) cell ej . Furthermore,
one attack dataset cannot be representative of every possible DDoS attack scenario. We suggest
replicating the procedure described above with various attack parameters to improve the robustness
of the detection system.
The last step in the training process is to partition the probability grid in two mutually exclusive
classes, the acceptance and rejection regions. This is achieved by performing multiple Neyman-
Pearson tests based on likelihood ratios estimated from the empirical pdf of the random variables
{Ni} and {Si} (see Formulas (5.1.1) and (5.2.6)).
5.2.3 Training Phase: Defining the Acceptance and Rejection Region
The main step in the detection procedure consists of partitioning the observation space into two
mutually exclusive subsets, the rejection R and acceptance A regions. An observation window ∆i
is said to be a threat if Ri ∈ R. On the contrary, label ∆i as non-threat if Ri ∈ A. Recall Ri
denotes the aggregated sensor response for ∆i, obtained by combining the two statistics Si and
Ni. The binary detection problem comprises the set of states X = {0, 1}, and the observation
space Y = YN × YS , described in (5.2.1). Section 5.2.1 presents the procedure to discretize the
observations space Y into cells using an inverse transform method. The likelihood ratio is evaluated
for each of these cells. The Neyman-Pearson criteria suggests rejecting the null hypothesis if the
likelihood ratio exceeds a threshold. The threshold η between R and A must be set such that the
false positive rate is minimized while the false negative rate remains under a fixed threshold δ.











Since no closed form expression exists for the pdf of Ri, the threshold η must be numerically
evaluated . Recall the vector describing the primary axis coordinates is ~U = [Ut1 ,Ut2 ,Ut3 , . . . ,UtC1 ].
Given Si ∈ (Uc−1,Uc], the Neyman-Pearson threshold is computed by numerically solving the
following optimization model:
maximize P {L(y) < ηc | y ∈ A}
subject to P {L(y) < ηc | y ∈ R} ≤ δ
0 ≤ ηc ≤ 1
(5.2.11)
The objective function consists of maximizing the ”true negative” rate subject to the constraint




η′c : P {L(y) < ηc} ≤ δ
}
(5.2.12)
Let Rc and Ac denote the rejection and acceptance regions when Si falls into the interval (Uc−1,Uc].
The decision variable ηc in (5.2.11) represents the threshold between Rc and Ac. The optimization
model in (5.2.11) is solved for each interval (Uc−1,Uc]. The thresholds {ηc} may vary depending
on the interval (Uc−1,Uc] where Si falls. In fact, as §i → 1, ηc gets smaller since the probability
of a threat gets higher. Note that the likelihood ratio in (5.2.11) is computed based on pdf of the
percentage of unknown source IP addresses. Consider an observation window Deltai containing mi
data packets. Assume data packets arrive according to the marked Poisson described in Section
2.1, and let Ai be the number of attack data packets and Ui the total number of legitimate data
packets with unknown source IP addresses in Deltai, respectively. Also define Qi as the number
of packet flows with unknown source IP addresses in ∆i. If collecting mi data packets requires ti
time units, then the independent increments and thinning properties of the Poisson process allows
us to deduce that Qi is a Poisson random variable with rate ζεti and L = (ζε + λς)ti, under H0
and H1, respectively. Proposition shows how to compute the likelihood ratio in (5.2.11).
Proposition 15. Set the maximum threat level as T = 0 (see Definition 13). The likelihood ratio






















Kj = u− q
 (5.2.14)










Kj = a− q
 .
Kj are iid mixture random variable and for any j,
P {Kj = k} = q
bc1c−1∑
i=1
pi 1 {k = xi}
1 {1 ≤ k ≤ bc1c − 1}+ q1α1cα11
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1 {k ≥ bc2c}
Proof. Recall τi is the assessed threat level of the observation window δi. Let T = 0, then the
likelihood ratio is then
L(y) =
P{Ni = y|τi > T}
P{Ni = y|τi ≤ T} =
P{Ui +Ai = ymi|τi > T}
P{Ui +Ai = ymi|τi ≤ T}
(a)
=
P{Ui +Ai = ymi|Ai > 0}
P{Ui +Ai = ymi|Ai = 0}
=
P{Ui +Ai = ymi, Ai > 0}











Equality (a) follows since τi is proportional to Ai, the number of attack data packets contained in
δi, and Ai > 0. Equality (b) holds since the number of attack packet flows with unknown source IP
addresses is a Poisson random variable with rate λςti and Ai = 0 implies that there are no arrival of
attack flow during ti. Given that Ui and Ai are compound random variables then Formula (5.2.14)
follow and Formula (5.2.15) is deduced from the definition of the distribution function of cluster
sizes (see Section 2.1).
5.2.4 Testing Phase
The testing phase, as the name indicates, consists of using a dataset representative of the target
network being under attack to evaluate the detection system. All techniques from the training
phase, including the data sampling, traffic statistics estimation, and classification into the 2D grid,
are reprised here except for the weighting method in Section 5.2.2. In fact, the training phase uses
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historical data that have attack packets clearly identified. However, that is not the case in the
testing phase since real-life attack data packets are not labeled as such. Following this reasoning,
τi the assessed threat value of ∆i is unknown until mi data packets have been collected. Therefore,
adjustments in the weighting function of the packet size statistic (Si) become necessary.
Let S˜i denote the packet size statistic in the testing phase. S˜i is defined as in (5.2.6) with weight
κ˜i. Define γi as the number of distinct source IP addresses that fall into observation window ∆i,
then
κ˜i =




where H is a positive constant. If γi < H, we assume the corresponding observation window is
more likely a non-threat. Therefore, the weight κ˜i is applied to decrease the value of Si so that
Si → 0. Else, if γi ≥ H, Si is increased proportionally to γi.
Setting the parameter H in (5.2.15) depends on the probability P {Ai ≥ 1 | γi ≥ H}, which is
the conditional probability that an observation window ∆i contains at least an attack data packet
given that it has at least H distinct unknown source IP addresses. H must be set such that the
probability P {Ai ≥ 1 | γi ≥ H} is maximized. Let ν and λ denote the total number of spoofed IP
addresses and the intensity of the DDoS attack, respectively. As ν and λ increase, the more likely
it is that a threat observation window contains more than H distinct unknown source IP addresses.
In the following, assume all attack packet flows have unknown source IP addresses. Proposition 16
gives the expression of the conditional probability P {Ai ≥ 1 | γi ≥ H}.
Proposition 16. Consider an observation window ∆i that contains mi data packets. Let γ
L
i
and γAi be the number of distinct unknown source IP addresses from legitimate and attack traffic,
respectively.
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γLi = h− x |Ui = z
}
in (5.2.18) is computed as in (5.2.19) with ν = n, w = z and
x = h− x. Moreover, P{γLi = x} = 0 for all x > n. Also P{γAi = z} = 0 for all z > ν. Therefore,
threshold H must satisfy the conditions H ≤ ν − 2 and H ≤ n− 1.
Proof.
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H−1∑
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P {γi = h}











= P {Ui = 0} = e−ζεti , and
P {γi = 0} = P {Ui = 0} × P {Ai = 0} = e−ζεti × e−λti















γLi = x ∩ ui > x
}
= 0 + P
{
γLi = x |ui = x
}
P {ui = x}+ P
{
γLi = x |ui > x
}
P {ui > x}
= P
{
γLi = x |ui = x
}





γLi = x |ui = u
}
P {Ui = u}
P
{
γLi = x |Ui = x
}
is the probability that ∆i contains Ui legitimate data packets with unknown
source IP addresses and all ui packets have distinct source IP addresses. P
{
γLi = x |Ui = u
}
is the
probability that ∆i contains Ui = u legitimate data packets. These u data packets can be separated
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(each with at least 1 element) of a set containing u elements. All x subsets must have distinct source
IP addresses. Selecting x distinct source IP addresses, from the set of legitimate unknown IP, is





= 0 if x > n. Equation (5.2.17) then follows by the thinning property of Poisson
processes and also the fact that source IP addresses are independent from legitimate packet arrival
times. The proof of P
{
γAi = x |Ai = w
}




only with ν instead of n.
Also the Poisson distribution rate is λti instead of ζεti. The proof of (5.2.18) is as follows:
P {γi = h} =
mi∑
y=0














γAi = x |Ui +Ai = y
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γAi = x |Ui +Ai = y
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The last equality follows by independence of the legitimate and attack packet flows processes.
From Proposition 16 we can deduce the expected number of distinct unknown source IP addresses
in an observation window ∆i, given that it contains at least one attack data packet. This assumes
the maximum threat level is T = 0.
Corollary 2. Consider an observation window ∆i that contains mi data packets. If collecting mi
data packets requires ti time units, then











































γLi = x− y
}
in Equation (5.2.20) is computed as in (5.2.17).
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Proof.
E {γi |Ai ≥ 1} =
mi∑
x=1





P {γi ∩ ai ≥ 1}































Assume λ > λL. As λ increases and , E {γi |Ai ≥ 1} → ν.
The following section presents some numerical results based on the MIT dataset. Unless otherwise
specified, the maximum threat level (see Definition 13) is set to T = 0.
5.3 Simulation Model and Computational Results
As mentioned earlier, legitimate data packets are real network traces collected from the MIT lincoln
laboratory network. Attack traffic is simulated, allowing us to vary parameters such as the rate,
the duration, and the start time. The next section describes how training/testing datasets are
obtained.
5.3.1 Training/ Testing Datasets
Constant rate DDoS are the most common [133, 82], therefore attack data packets are generated
according to an homogeneous Poisson process with rate λ. Let d denote the duration in time
units. The spoofed source IP library (SSIL) is artificially designed and each attack data packet
is assigned an IP address at random, following a uniform distribution [18, 35]. Using a standard
uniform distribution means the master attacker doesn’t have a preference over the spoofed IP
addresses he has created. Unless otherwise specified, our experiments use |ν| = 8; Du and Abe [29]
set |ν| > 50. Note that the larger ν, the easier the detection problem, especially if we monitor the
percentage of distinct unknown source IP addresses. Let Π denote the proportion of attack data
packet with respect to the total number of data packets. Π can be controlled through the attack
parameters d and λ. Shon and Moon [113] set Π = 1 − 1.5% while Carl et al. [18] let Π = 20%.
Du and Abe [29] state that DDoS attacks are effectively detected if Π = 40%. In all following
simulations, Π ranges from 2 to 35%. Some examples of training datasets are given in Table 5.4.
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Table 5.4: Training Data with DDoS Data Packets
Dataset Start Time (s) Duration d (s) Rate λ (pps) Packet Size (bytes) Π (%)
W1-M-DDoS-1 6 3600 10 40 5.30
W1-M-DDoS-2 70000 1800 160 1500 30.62
W1-M-DDoS-3 17200 300 500 576 18.72
W1-Th-DDoS-2 3500 1800 10 40 1.96
Start time indicates when the first attack packet arrives at the control router. Given that the
arrival rate of legitimate data packets varies with time (see Figure 2.3), the attack start time is an
important parameter. In fact, a DDoS attack is more easily detected if there are less legitimate
traffic that arrive at the control router at the same time.
5.3.2 Probability Grid
Given the W1-M dataset, Figure 5.4 illustrates a probability grid with cdf steps set to C1 = C2 = 10
and sampling parameters of mL = 20 and mU = 50. Recall, W1-M contains only legitimate data
packets. The likelihood ratio is estimated using a combination of legitimate data packets from
W1-M and attack data packets W1-M-DDoS-2; see Table 5.4 for the DDoS parameters. Attack
and legitimate datasets are combined based on the arrival time of data packets. In Figure 5.4, the
Figure 5.4: Probability Grid with Acceptance and Rejection Regions
maximum threat level is T = 0, meaning that observation windows are considered to be a threat
if they contain at least one attack data packet. It is important to emphasize that a single dataset
cannot possibly represent all cases of attacks and determine for certain which grid cells belong to
the acceptance/rejection regions. Replicating the likelihood ratio estimation with different attack
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datasets is an efficient way of overcoming this limitation. Besides all DDoS parameters, there are
other factors that can influence the shape of the acceptance and rejection regions. These include
the sampling parameters mL and mU , the cdf steps C1 and C2, and the maximum threat level T.
5.3.3 Effect of Upper Bound on Packet Sampling
Simulations showed that truncating the data collection process using the upper bound mU induces
values such that legitimate data behave like attack data packets. In other words, given that
an observation window ∆i of size mi contains mi legitimate data packets and yields statistics
Ni = Si = 1, the conditional probability that mi = mU is one. Table 5.5 summarizes the probability
of event {N = 1, S = 1} for various lower and upper bounds, mL and mU . Data are shown for the
W1-M dataset.
Table 5.5: Probability of Event {N = 1, S = 1}






Entries in Table 5.5 indicate that for a fixed upper bound mU , the probability P {N = 1, S = 1}
increases as the lower bound mL increases, . Moreover, the larger mU , the lower P {N = 1, S = 1}.
The probability distribution function of event {N = 1, S = 1} could not be formally characterized.
Distribution fitting with the geometric (G) and normal (N) distributions did not yield any con-
clusive results, as shown in Table 5.6. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test is performed and the null
hypothesis is rejected at 5% significance level for all but one.
Table 5.6: P-Values
Sampling Distribution Chi Stat P-value
mL = 10, mU = 20 G(0.0055) 67.76 1.9345e-15
mL = 10, mU = 20 N(175.16, 454.03) 86.43 1.4506e-20
mL = 20, mU = 50 G(0.0015) 3.2525 0.1967
mL = 20, mU = 50 N(640.87, 1231.33) 9.8351 0.0017
Even though the event {N = 1, S = 1} occurs with a very small probability, it is still an unde-
sirable result. This can prevented by modifying the weight function on the packet size random
variable Si. Since all data packets have the same size then σi = 0, an adjustment, other than
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In the next section, we present detection results along with error probabilities. We also compare
the proposed detection model to some existing mechanisms.
5.3.4 Model Evaluation: FP and FC rates
The objective of this section is to prove the effectiveness of our detection system. Six testing data,
presented in Table 5.7, are created using W3-F as legitimate traffic. Columns 2-5 specify the DDoS
attack parameters. For each dataset, the last column gives the proportion of attack data packets
with respect to the total number of data packets.
Table 5.7: Testing Data with DDoS
Dataset Start Time (s) Duration d (s) Rate λ (pps) Packet Size (bytes) Π (%)
W3-F-DDoS-1 50 1800 10 576 2.16
W3-F-DDoS-2 50 1800 160 576 15.82
W3-F-DDoS-3 50 1800 500 576 35.57
W3-F-DDoS-4 13200 1800 500 576 25.77
W3-F-DDoS-5 50 1800 500 60 15.49
W3-F-DDoS-6 50 300 500 576 2.8
For testing, two probability grids are considered. Grid W1-M-DDoS-1 is trained with a low attack
rate (λ = 10pps) and Grid W1-M-DDoS-2 with a medium attack rate (λ = 160pps). Table 5.8
summarizes the probabilities of false negatives and false positives. Results expressed in percentage.
The former is estimated as the ratio of number of threat observation windows in the acceptance
region A with respect to the total number of threat observation windows. The second number
indicates the false positives rate, given by the ratio of number of non-threat observation windows
in the attack region to the total number of non-threat observation windows. All datasets are
sampled with parameters mL = 20 and mU = 50 and the packet size statistic is weighted with
parameter H = 1 (see Formula 5.2.15). H = 1 implies that any observation window ∆i with one
or more unknown source IP addresses is considered as a threat.
Although Grid W1-M-DDoS-1 performs well with a 100% detection rate, the false alarm rates
are prohibitively high for all testing datasets. Entries in Table 5.8 demonstrate the importance
of a well-trained model, which can be achieved by replication of the training phase with different
attack parameters. In fact, a DDoS detection system trained with medium rates DDoS, namely
Grid W1-M-DDoS-2, effectively detects medium and high rate DDoS with great FP and FN rates
while its performance is less desirable with low DDoS rate data (W3-F-DDoS-1). Depending on
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Table 5.8: FP-FN Rates with H = 1
Dataset — Grid Grid W1-M-DDoS-1 Grid W1-M-DDoS-2
W3-F-DDoS-1 {0.0; 48.47} {12.14; 25.99}
W3-F-DDoS-2 {0.0; 48.7} {0.031; 26.02}
W3-F-DDoS-3 {0.0; 48.7} {0.0; 26.01}
W3-F-DDoS-4 {0.0; 49.51} {0.66; 26.92}
W3-F-DDoS-5 {0.0; 48.7} {0.016; 26.02}
W3-F-DDoS-6 {0.0; 48.6} {0.0; 25.93}
the application, a 12% false negative rate can be deemed acceptable. On the other hand, a DDoS
detection system trained with low rates DDoS, in this case Grid W1-M-DDoS-1, results in a larger
attack region. Consequently, it correctly identifies threats from low, medium and high DDoS attacks
however, FP rates are very high.
Another experiment is performed with the parameter H = 3, meaning observation windows are
considered as a threat if they contain at least three distinct unknown source IP addresses. Table
5.9 shows detection performances results from which we conclude that the false positive rates are
much lower when H is large.
Table 5.9: FP-FN Rates with H = 3
Dataset — Grid Grid W1-M-DDoS-1 Grid W1-M-DDoS-2
W3-F-DDoS-1 {14.5; 18.37} {15.14; 3.7}
W3-F-DDoS-2 {0.11; 16.25} {0.12; 2.49}
W3-F-DDoS-3 {0.0; 18.38} {0.0; 3.7}
Observe that the false negative rates for Grid W1-M-DDoS-1 have increased. To illustrate why,
we plot, in Figure 5.5, the probability mass functions (pmf) of the number of distinct unknown
source IP addresses (γ) in observation windows. The first and second graphs show the pmfs for
non-threat and threat observation windows, respectively. The means of the distribution in Figure
5.5 are given in Table 5.10.
Table 5.10: γi’s Expectated Values




While the number of distinct unknown source IP addresses are very similar for non-threat ob-
servation windows, it is not the case for threat observation windows. The rate of the DDoS attack
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Figure 5.5: Pmf Distinct Unknown Source IP Addresses
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clearly has a significant impact on the density functions. As expected, non-threat observation win-
dows contain very few unknown source IP addresses regardless of the DDoS rate λ. On the contrary,
as the attack rate λ increases, threat observation windows tend to contain more unknown source
IP addresses. Note that the number of distinct unknown source IP addresses in threat observation
windows also depends on ν, the number of spoofed IP addresses. Figure 5.5 illustrate simulation
results for ν = 8 and 10% of legitimate source IP addresses are unknown.
In summary, large values of H perform well if the DDoS attack has a medium to high rate
because {γi}, the distinct unknown source IP addresses random variables, take larger values. This
emphasizes again that DDoS detection is harder if the attack rate is lower than the legitimate
traffic rate. Overall, Grid W1-M-DDoS-2 provides better FP and FN rates compared to Grid W1-
M-DDoS-1. Decision-makers should design probability grids with attack/clear regions based on
historical attack data but also by taking into consideration their legitimate traffic rate. Clearly,
designing DDoS detection systems requires a trade-off between the false positive and negative rates.
Comparing to Other Detection Systems
As emphasized by Mirkovic et al. [83], comparing detection models is not an obvious task mainly
due to the disparity of testing conditions. Even testing datasets greatly vary from one research study
to another. Below we attempt to compare the performances of our detection models against those
presented in [101, 29]. In the following experiments, the number of spoofed source IP addresses is
ν = 15, the attack starts at t = 50s and lasts d = 300s, and 2% of legitimate source IP addresses
are unknown. Peng et al. [101] uses the Auckland dataset as legitimate traffic while we use the 1999
DARPA dataset, the latter is a most realistic dataset because data packets have different sizes. The
attack in their experiments has rate 500 kbps. We reproduce the attack rate as a combination of
number of packets per second rate and packet sizes as shown in Table 5.11. When ν = 15, their
detection system yields 90% (see Table III in [101]) with a detection delay of 127.3s, while our
detection model achieves a 100% detection rate (DR) and a 3% false alarm rate (FR).
Table 5.11: Comparing with IP Filtering [101]
Legitimate Rate Size DR (%) [101] DR (%) FP (%)
Auckland 500 kbps – 90 100 –
DARPA W3-F 870 pps 576 90 100 2.8
DARPA W3-F 335 pps 1500 90 100 2.8
DARPA W3-F 10 pps 576 90 99 2.8
The higher the DDoS attack rate, with respect to legitimate traffic rate, the easier the detection.
The last entry line in Table 5.11 shows that even when the attack rate is much lower than 500
kbps, i.e. 10*576=5760 bps, our method can achieve 99% detection rate. Note that the start
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time is also an important factor in the detection performance; the reason being the inhomogeneous
packet arrival rate.
In comparing our work with the entropy method by Du and Abe [29], we use 50 spoofed source
IP addresses. In their case ν ≥ 50. In both experiments, all attack data packets are 1500 bytes
long, and attack traffics are Poisson processes. Our attack starts at t = 50s and 10% of legitimate
data packets have unknown source IP addresses. The rate and duration of the DDoS attack are
given in the first and second columns of Table 5.12, respectively. Table 5.12 proves that our method
can detect very short DDoS attacks.
Table 5.12: Comparing with IP Filtering [29]
Legitimate Rate (pps) Duration (s) DR (%) [29] DR (%)
DARPA 100 2 90 100
DARPA W3-F 200 1 90 100
DARPA W3-F 300 0.667 95 100
DARPA W3-F 400 0.5 100 100
Tartakovsky et al. [116] propose a sequential change point method where data packets are par-
titioned by time intervals and size. Although they emphasize that their MNA-CUSUM algorithm
does not better than the log-likelihood ratio based CUSUM, it still yields good detection results.
We created a testing dataset using the W3-F as legitimate traffic combined with attack data packets
that constituted 20% of the total traffic. The testing conditions for the MNA-CUSUM algorithm
include sampling data packets each 1s time interval, with three bins each, i.e. packets were classified
in bin 1, 2 or 3 if their size was less than 576 bytes, between 576 and 1500 bytes, and finally larger
than 1500 bytes. Three type of data packets were monitored, TCP, UDP or ICMP. The historical
mean for TCP with size under 576 bytes was estimated as 58.97. The DDoS attack parameters
were taken from [116] as d = 60s, λ = 3177pps, size = 60bytes. Because the attack rate is so
high, our detection model yield a 100% detection rate and MNA-CUSUM had no detection delay,
meaning the attack was detected right at the start. For a better evaluation, further simulations
should be run with a much lower attack rate.
5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we presented an efficient mechanism for DDoS detection. Contrary to Peng et al.
[101] who compare the percentage of unique new source IP addresses to a threshold and build
a random sequence, our method finds the percentage of unknown source IP addresses for each
predefined observation window. The second statistic is computed as the mean to standard deviation
ratio of packet sizes for the same observation window. The two heterogeneous statistics allow
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monitoring different aspects of Internet traffic at once to effectively distinguish legitimate from
attack data. Detection results are more reliable than using only one statistic.
The advantage of the supervised learning detection model is that the acceptance and rejection
are built and maintained off-line. Therefore, new data packets can be observed and classified as
a threat or non-threat immediately. In case of malicious data packets, significant damages to the




The last chapter provides a brief overview of the research presented in this thesis. Potential direc-
tions for future research are also outlined.
6.1 Summary
Using an anomaly-based approach this thesis presents three novel techniques (parametric and em-
pirical) to detect DDoS attacks. We particularly address the detection of flooding attacks at the
victim end. The models are shown to be efficient as the detection error probabilities are minimized.
The first two systems are parametric that is they assume network traffic can be modeled as a
marked Poisson process. Legitimate and attack packet flows arrive at the control router indepen-
dently of each other, according to a Poisson process. The flow cluster size, that is the number of
data packets contained in the packet flow, is a mixture random variable.
The first detection model is formulated as a fixed sample size binary hypothesis testing. The
decision making is based on the Neyman-Pearson criteria. The second parametric model is a sequen-
tial probability ratio test, that is the sample size is a random variable. The acceptance/rejection
boundaries are deduced based on Wald’s Fundamental Identity. Although it allows the use of ef-
ficient theoretical results, developing parametric models tend to be more challenging given that
they address both estimation and detection issues. Moreover, parametric distributions may fail to
capture the complex and dynamic nature of the Internet, therefore a third non-parametric detection
model is proposed. The likelihood ratio is estimated using a probability grid and Neyman-Pearson
threshold is numerically estimated. Our detection systems are designed to detect stealthy attacks
including where IP spoofing is used to make attack data packets seem to originate from a known
source.
The work presented in this thesis is relevant to several areas other than network security. In
fact, there are evidence of heavy tail random variables in the following areas: household income,
claim size in insurance, daily log-returns in financial markets, and geophysics. Therefore, the
mathematical tools presented here can be useful in all these areas.
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6.2 Possible Research Extensions
The work presented here can be extended in several possible ways. DDoS attacks are getting more
and more elaborate, therefore detection models must become even more efficient. The first possible
extension is to develop additional traffic statistics and eventually extend the detection mechanism
to integrate more than two statistic. In particular, we can extend the marked Poisson process
presented in Section in order to include the average packet size for packet flows. Monitoring the
average packet rate for packet flows [35] or evaluating how often data packets with same header
appear at the control router can be also efficient in detecting DDoS attacks.
For networks with substantial traffic, the marked Poisson distribution can be extended to model
network traffic at the session level. As session is defined as a set of packet flows. Hohn et al. [55]
suggest the log-normal distribution to model session sizes in number of data packets. Theoretical
results from detection can then be applied.
Furthermore, the evaluation procedure for our detection models can be improved by testing their
behavior in the presence of a flash crowd. The latter is defined as a surge of requests from legitimate
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Ujevic and Roberts [120] propose the Optimal 3-point rule (O3R) as a linear combination of LPR,
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